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ABSTRACT
How can capital defense lawyers craft narratives that neutralize jurors’
unconscious racial and ethnic biases? A well-developed body of research in
cognitive psychology indicates that despite even the best of intentions and the
absence of conscious prejudice, most Americans harbor unconscious biases
against African Americans. These biases influence what we actually perceive,
how we interpret what we perceive, and how we act. For reasons related to the
content and structure of capital sentencing trials, these unconscious biases are
particularly likely to influence capital jurors. In effect, unconscious racial bias
acts as an invisible witness against the African American defendant, buttressing
the prosecution’s claims concerning his incorrigibility and undermining his
case in mitigation. Moreover, implicit bias operates even when—perhaps
especially when—race is not explicitly at issue. Yet most capital defense
lawyers do little to confront this invisible witness.
This Article places the capital defendant at the intersection of cognitive
psychology and narrative theory. Specifically, it addresses the following
questions: When constructing mitigation narratives, how should capital defense
lawyers take into account the research of cognitive scientists on implicit racial
biases? What narrative strategies effectively neutralize the testimony of the
invisible witness? In attempting to answer these questions, this Article analyzes
the opening and closing statements from two capital sentencing trials.
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INTRODUCTION

The past ten to fifteen years have seen an explosion in legal scholarship
concerning potential applications of cognitive science1—particularly of
psychological research concerning stereotyping and implicit biases—to legal

1

The term cognitive science defies simple definition, but a basic definition should suffice for
the purposes of this Article: “Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary scientific study of the
mind and its processes. It examines what cognition is, what it does and how it works.” Cognitive
Science, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_science (last visited Sept. 16, 2012).

WILKINS (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/24/2012 4:59 PM

CONFRONTING THE INVISIBLE WITNESS

307

doctrines, structures, and theories.2 The questions raised by the scholarship are
fascinating: Should the legal system reconceive its employment discrimination
doctrines?3 Should jury selection be rethought?4 Is national school reform
legislation doomed to fail due to its failure to account for parents’ implicit
biases?5 Underlying all of these questions is a sometimes tacit and sometimes
open challenge to the primacy of rational choice theory,6 which has long driven
much judicial decision-making.7
Recent years have also seen renewed scholarly interest in the use of
both narrative and metaphor in law.8 All lawyers—litigators most obviously—

2

See generally Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating the
Emerging Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 352 (2010) (providing extensive
bibliography of scholarship about the intersection of law and neuroscience).
3
See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1004 (2006)
(noting scholarly arguments that “established civil rights jurisprudence is premised on models of
social perception and judgment that have been significantly discredited by empirical work in
social and cognitive psychology”); see also id. at 1003–04 nn.21–23 (pointing to articles
advocating changes in employment discrimination doctrine).
4
See, e.g., Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury
Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and
Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2010) (arguing, inter alia, for the elimination
of peremptory challenges during jury selection); Dale Larson, A Fair and Implicitly Impartial
Jury: An Argument for Administering the Implicit Association Test During Voir Dire, 3 DEPAUL
J. FOR SOC. JUST. 139 (2010) (arguing voir dire should include administration of the implicit
association test to potential jurors).
5
See Susan L. DeJarnatt, School Choice and the (Ir)rational Parent, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL’Y 1 (2008).
6
There are many definitions of rational choice theory, but I will provide one of the simplest.
Rational choice theory is a “theory that behavioral choices . . . are based on purposeful decisions
that the potential benefits [of a choice] outweigh the risks.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1376 (9th
ed. 2009). This definition is, of course, incomplete. See David J. Arkush, Situating Emotion: A
Critical Realist View of Emotion and Nonconscious Cognitive Processes for Law and Legal
Theory, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1275, 1278 n.3 (2008) (“Despite its multi-decade prominence,
‘rational choice theory’ lacks a settled definition.”).
7
See, e.g., Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology: Judicial
Politics Scholarship and Naïve Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 232–34 (2009) (“A
large and growing body of law and psychology scholarship has posed new challenges to
traditional assumptions about the behavior of legal actors. While mainstream legal thought has
often treated individuals as more or less rational, autonomous actors, scholars in a variety of
fields are presenting a new, empirically based, and more formal challenge to law’s traditional
conceptions of human behavior. . . . [B]ehavioral realists have called for legal analysis grounded
in the findings of social science and have given special attention to the ways in which implicit
bias might affect how we approach antidiscrimination policy.”).
8
The academic legal writing community, of which I am a part, recently devoted an entire
volume to metaphor and narrative (storytelling). See Bruce Ching, Argument, Analogy, and
Audience: Using Persuasive Comparisons While Avoiding Unintended Affects, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL
WRITING DIRECTORS 311 (2010). Of course, there is a neuroscience of narrative as well; that is,

WILKINS (DO NOT DELETE)

308

10/24/2012 4:59 PM

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115

are storytellers, but the legal academy all too often has treated narrative and
metaphor as the “darker brother[s] . . . [sent] to eat in the kitchen/When
company comes.”9 The light-skinned brother, considered smarter, more
effective, more respectable, is, of course, logical, syllogistic reasoning.10
Recently, however, legal scholarship has invited narrative and metaphor to the
table, and this invitation has yielded stimulating discourse on a variety of
topics, such as the role of narrative in legal education,11 the implications of
using certain metaphors in custody disputes,12 and the use of myth in
constitutional litigation.13
The recent focus on both cognitive science and narrative has been most
apparent in scholarship and commentary concerning criminal law and the death
penalty. Articles about the application of cognitive science to criminal and
death penalty law have focused principally on legal actors’ implicit racial
biases14 and have yielded a variety of recommendations. For example, some
have advocated reforming the Batson framework for use of peremptory

cognitive scientists and others have studied humans’ need for narrative and metaphor. See infra
Part III.
9
LANGSTON HUGHES, I, Too, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES 46, 46
(Arnold Rampersad & David Roessel eds., 1995).
10
See, e.g., Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power
of Story, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 1, 4 (2010) (“Some appellate judges claim that
they are persuaded only by the legal argument, not by any emotional appeal. Some reject the
notion that emotional appeal has any place in appellate advocacy. The rule of law, they claim,
requires logical arguments, clearly and neutrally applied. For example, Justice Antonin Scalia
and author Bryan Garner argue that ‘[a]ppealing to judges’ emotions is misguided . . . . Good
judges pride themselves on the rationality of their rulings and the suppression of their personal
proclivities, including most especially their emotions.’ Instead of emotional appeals, they write,
‘persuasion is possible only because all human beings are born with a capacity for logical
thought . . . . The most rigorous form of logic, and hence the most persuasive, is the syllogism.’
Senior Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert writes that a brief is ‘nothing more or less than an expanded
categorical syllogism.’”) (internal citations omitted).
11
See, e.g., Carolyn Grose, Storytelling Across the Curriculum: From Margin to Center, from
Clinic to the Classroom, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 37 (2010) (describing the uses of
narrative theory and storytelling in the law school curriculum).
12
See Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision
Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody
Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 260 (2009) (arguing that “the cognitive setting for
custody disputes—cluttered with outmoded metaphors, simplistic images, and unexamined
narratives—interferes with the ability of judges to attend to complex and radical transformations
of parent-child relationships”).
13
See Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77
TENN. L. REV. 883 (2010) (analyzing the creation and birth myths used in the Supreme Court
briefs in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
14
Articles touching on these issues are almost too numerous to mention. For one of the most
comprehensive, see Justin D. Levinson, Race, Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 58 DEPAUL L.
REV. 599 (2009).
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challenges;15 others, educating jurors during capital sentencing about racism as
“structural mitigation”;16 others, removing the Confederate flag from
courthouse grounds;17 still others, abolishing the death penalty outright.18 Many
articles have simply defined the nature and scope of the problem.19 The
research on implicit racial biases certainly is consistent with and may explain,
to a degree, the studies suggesting race (that of the victim as well as that of the
defendant himself) acts as a thumb on the “death” scale for African-American
defendants during capital sentencing.20
Unlike that on law and neuroscience, the literature concerning narrative
technique and death penalty litigation enjoys a long history.21 Still, such articles

15

See Antony Page, Batson’s Blind Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005) (using research concerning implicit biases to criticize
current framework for peremptory challenges and proposing reforms that take implicit bias into
account).
16
See Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism,
Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.1557 (2004) (arguing for
educating capital sentencing juries about biographical racism as a form of structural mitigation).
Haney defines the term structural mitigation as “mitigation that is structured into the lives of
African-American defendants by the various forms of life-altering racism that remain in
American society.” Id. at 1577. For further discussion of this issue, see infra Part III.C.
17
See Cecilia Trenticosta & William C. Collins, Death and Dixie: How the Courthouse
Confederate Flag Influences Capital Cases in Louisiana, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST.
125 (2011) (arguing that the Confederate flag activates jurors’ implicit racial biases and thus
disadvantages black capital defendants).
18
Cf. Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the
Eighth Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2083 (2004) (although not focusing specifically on implicit biases and
cognitive science, arguing that the prevalence of unconscious racial discrimination by judges,
prosecutors, and jurors require a conclusion that the death penalty violates the Eighth
Amendment’s desert-limitation principle); Alycee Lane, “Hang Them if They Have to Be Hung”:
Mitigation Discourse, Black Families, and Racial Stereotypes, 12 NEW. CRIM. L. REV. 171, 204
(2009) (discussing “how impossible it is to . . . ensure that a black defendant is fairly tried” and
concluding “[i]t is simply time to abolish the death penalty”).
19
See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 14; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539 (2004) (recounting
an experiment suggesting capital defense lawyers possess implicit racial bias).
20
See infra Part II.
21
See, e.g., Christopher J. Meade, Reading Death Sentences: The Narrative Construction of
Capital Punishment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 732 (1996) (arguing, inter alia, that death penalty
defense lawyers should use narrative as an anti-death penalty strategy); see also Jeffrey J.
Pokorak, Dead Man Talking: Competing Narratives and Effective Representation in Capital
Cases, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 421 (1999) (describing importance of competing narratives offered by
the prosecution and defense in capital cases); Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy & Death Penalty
Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 357 (1996) (describing the “work of death penalty
lawyers as the work of constructing narratives”).
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have proliferated in the past decade,22 and contemporary scholarship even
features a symposium on storytelling and the death penalty.23 Perhaps most of
this literature focuses on storytelling during appellate and post-conviction
proceedings,24 although some looks to capital trials and even earlier stages of
capital litigation (such as when prosecutors are considering whether to seek the
death penalty).25 The articles generally agree that effective capital defense
storytelling is “meticulously built upon a record”26 supported by a “truly
comprehensive investigation”;27 “unsettle[s] things”28 by creating “persuasive
and credible counter-narrative[s] that . . . better account for the facts at hand
[and that] may be used to debunk, neutralize, or even supplant the
[prosecution’s] master narrative with which it is competing”;29 and—pardon the
cliché—”humanizes” the defendant.30
This Article places the capital defendant at the intersection of cognitive
science and narrative theory. Despite great interest in and a plethora of
scholarship on race and capital punishment,31 most how-to guides on narrative
construction in capital cases have treated narrative as race-neutral; that is, such
guides typically do not address the possibility that lawyers’ narrative strategies
should vary based on the race or ethnicity of the defendant (and possibly of the
22

See, e.g., Philip N. Meyer, Are the Characters in a Death Penalty Brief Like the
Characters in a Movie?, 32 VT. L. REV. 877, 878 (2008) (noting that “narrative persuasion is at
the core of [capital] post-conviction relief practice” and providing advocates with basic principles
of effective characterization); cf. Craig Haney, Media Criminology and the Death Penalty, 58
DEPAUL L. REV. 689 (2009) (discussing how flawed media narratives about crime influence
administration of the death penalty in the United States).
23
See Sean D. O’Brien, Death Penalty Stories: Lessons in Life-Saving Narratives, 77 UMKC
L. REV. 831 (2009) (introducing articles in University of Missouri - Kansas City’s 2009 Law
Review Symposium on Death Penalty Stories).
24
See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 22 (focusing on appellate and post-conviction litigation).
25
See, e.g., Michael N. Burt, The Importance of Storytelling at All Stages of a Capital Case,
77 UMKC L. REV. 877, 879 (2009) (exploring how “‘mitigation counter-narrative[s]’ [are]
actually developed and presented by skilled capital defense teams”).
26
Meyer, supra note 22, at 878.
27
John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Back to a Future: Reversing Keith Simpson’s Death
Sentence and Making Peace with the Victim’s Family Through Post-Conviction Investigation, 77
UMKC L. REV. 963, 963 (2009).
28
Mark E. Olive, Narrative Works, 77 UMKC L. REV. 989, 989 (2009).
29
Craig Haney, On Mitigation as Counter-Narrative: A Case Study of the Hidden Context of
Prison Violence, 77 UMKC L. REV. 911, 913 (2009).
30
E.g. Sarat, supra note 21, at 370 (“Thus, whether narratives emphasize ‘discrete’ stories or
universal experiences, the overriding strategic goal in the narratives constructed by all death
penalty lawyers is to humanize the client.”).
31
A February 21, 2012 search of the “JLR” database on WESTLAW containing search terms
race & (“death penalty” “capital punishment”) yielded 10,000 documents. Even assuming
many—say, half or even three-quarters—of those articles were not on point, the sheer number of
documents responsive to my search makes the point far better than a string citation could.
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victim).32 This Article considers that very possibility, specifically examining
the following question: If, as suggested above, race acts as a kind of thumb on
the “death” scale for African-American and other minority defendants, what
kinds of narratives, metaphors, and images help to remove that thumb? (This is
a separate, albeit related question from what kinds of narratives place weight on
the “life” scale for defendants.) How should capital defense lawyers take into
account the research of cognitive scientists on implicit racial biases when
constructing mitigation narratives? My basic thesis is that capital jurors’
implicit racial biases can be minimized (at least to a degree) through the use of
proper narrative strategies during trial, and this Article attempts to show how
lawyers can use narrative to neutralize (at least during trial) such biases.
This topic is limited, focusing solely on the construction of narratives
during the sentencing phase of capital trials.
Capital sentencing is my locus of concern for two reasons. First,
although jurors’ implicit racial biases probably affect their determinations
during the guilt-or-innocence phase of capital trials,33 I am principally
concerned with ensuring greater racial justice for guilty defendants (or those
who have been adjudicated guilty).34 Those guilty of capital murder may have
forfeited many rights, but surely the right to equal treatment without regard to
race or ethnicity is not one of them. Moreover, many good minds are already
focused on issues concerning innocence and the many causes of wrongful
convictions.35 Second, implicit racial biases may affect capital appellate and
post-conviction proceedings, but, in my view, they likely have less of an effect
during such proceedings than during capital sentencing. Race is a more salient

32

But see Lane, supra note 18, at 188 (“Because it does not even begin to address the
intersection of race and family, mitigation discourse presents to jurors the defendant’s
‘dysfunctional family’ as if it will do the same kind of work for all defendants, regardless of
race.”).
33
Cf. Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 345 (2007) [hereinafter Levinson, Forgotten Racial
Equality] (arguing that “implicit racial biases affect the way judges and jurors encode, store, and
recall relevant case facts” and that this “perpetuates racial bias in case outcomes”); Justin D.
Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8
OHIO ST. J. ON CRIM. L. 187 (2010) (discussing a psychological experiment that showed mock
jurors implicitly associated blackness with criminal guilt and found that implicit biases predicted
mock jurors’ evaluation of ambiguous evidence).
34
Cf. Hugo Adam Bedau, Racism, Wrongful Convictions, and the Death Penalty, 76 TENN. L.
REV. 615, 623 (2009) (comparing and contrasting anti-death penalty arguments concerning
wrongful convictions and those concerning racial bias, and concluding the two issues are “twin
evils paramount in our current death penalty system”).
35
Again, the literature is too voluminous to include in one footnote. For a recent discussion
of issues concerning wrongful convictions, see BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS GO WRONG (2011).
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feature when viewed in the flesh than when mentioned on paper;36 furthermore,
unlike capital sentencing proceedings, capital appellate and post-conviction
proceedings typically do not focus directly on the defendant’s moral desert but
on narrower legal issues (although ineffective assistance claims often do shed
new light on a defendant’s actual character).
My limiting the question to narrative strategy—what kinds of
narratives, metaphors, and images might reduce or neutralize jurors’ implicit
biases—is pragmatic. Of course, narrative alone cannot lift the thumb. After all,
it’s a pretty big thumb. Different jury instructions may have a role to play.37
More diverse juries have a major role to play.38 And so forth. However, major
structural reforms such as constitutionally mandated changes to jury selection
procedures have not and may never arrive. In the meantime, capital defense
lawyers must craft mitigation narratives anyway and, in fact, have great liberty
in doing so.39 It simply makes sense to focus on an area that might yield
immediate returns.
Finally, although this Article examines the construction of defense
narratives, prosecutors certainly should seek to reduce jurors’ racial bias as
well. If, as most prosecutors would contend, a jury’s death sentence should
reflect a defendant’s actual moral desert, then prosecutors should welcome
measures that reduce the influence of race.40
This Article proceeds in four parts. Following this Introduction, Part II
summarizes the research of cognitive scientists on implicit racial biases and
suggests how such biases infect the capital sentencing process. As Part II
makes clear, implicit racial biases are prevalent in American society and almost
certainly affect the capital sentencing process.41 Part III shifts direction,
introducing the reader to theories concerning narrative and metaphor,

36
Cf. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1503 (2005) (noting that
“racial schemas are ‘chronically accessible’ and can be triggered by the target’s mere appearance,
since we as observers are especially sensitive to visual and physical cues”).
37
See Bennett, supra note 4, at 169 (suggesting instructing jurors on implicit biases); see also
Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 33 (regarding jury instructions to function as
debiasing measures).
38
See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
969, 981 (2006) (“A significant body of social science evidence supports the conclusion that the
presence of population diversity in an environment tends to reduce the level of implicit bias.”).
39
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (discussing constitutional duty of defense
counsel to investigate and, where appropriate, present mitigating evidence that might include
evidence concerning child abuse, psychiatric diagnoses, and other impairments); see also Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (noting capital defendant’s right to offer wide variety of mitigating
evidence).
40
Cf. Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1331 (2006) (noting the risk that notions of moral desert “may serve as a
‘placeholder’ for [racial] prejudice and bias”).
41
See infra Part II.
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discussing the typical use of narrative during capital sentencing, and critiquing
that use of narrative as applied to capital defendants. Part IV turns to solutions
and brings together the material in Parts II and III by advancing a few tentative
ideas about how lawyers can craft narratives and employ metaphors to reduce
jurors’ racial biases. In advancing these ideas, I analyze the opening and
closing arguments from two capital sentencing trials.
II. THE UNCONSCIOUS NEVER SLEEPS: THE ROLE OF IMPLICIT BIAS,
STEREOTYPING, AND STEREOTYPE PRIMING IN THE TRIALS OF BLACK CAPITAL
DEFENDANTS
I am the American heartbreakRock on which Freedom
Stumps its toeThe great mistake
That Jamestown
Made long ago.42
One needn’t be a scholar of the death penalty—in fact, one needn’t be
much more than a casual observer—to know that the history of the death
penalty in America is inseparable from America’s strange and tragic racial
history.43 In the nineteenth century, for example, Black Codes authorized
capital punishment for crimes that were noncapital—at times, non-criminal—if
committed by whites.44 In fact, “[s]ince the Civil War, blacks have been
executed for lesser crimes, at younger ages, and more often without appeals
than whites; and over this period they have been disproportionately executed
for crimes against whites.”45 To this day, the death penalty is (with minor
exceptions) most robust in the former slave states and in those states that once
had the highest lynching rates.46

42
LANGSTON HUGHES, American Heartbreak, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON
HUGHES, supra note 9, at 385. This short poem by Langston Hughes captures the central, tragic,
and starring role racism has played in American history. See id.
43
For a variety of interesting and comprehensive discussions concerning race and capital
punishment, see generally FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006).
44
STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 112–43 (2003) (discussing
differences in the death penalty in the North and South during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
centuries).
45
William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of
the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 175 (2001).
46
See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man’s Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in
America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15, 18 (2002). Ogletree asserts that “the racially disproportionate
application of the death penalty can be seen as being in historical continuity with the long and
sordid history of lynching in this country. . . . [T]he states of what is often called the ‘Death
Belt’—the southern states that together account for . . . [over ninety percent of] all executions
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This racial history has functioned at times implicitly (as “sub-text”) and
at times explicitly (as “text”) in the Supreme Court’s post-Furman v. Georgia47
death penalty jurisprudence. The modern anti-death penalty movement began
primarily as an arm of the civil rights movement, with the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) Legal Defense Fund
taking the lead role in such seminal cases as Furman v. Georgia and Coker v.
Georgia.48 Race served as sub-text in both of these cases, but particularly in
Coker. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Coker was facially race-neutral: the
Eighth Amendment bars imposition of the death penalty for rape.49 However, as
many have pointed out,50 the Court was well aware that, as a practical matter,
the only defendants sentenced to death for rape were black men convicted of
raping white women. Although the opinion itself made no mention of this fact,
the practical effect of the opinion was to ameliorate the disproportionate burden
Georgia’s law placed on African American defendants.
If race functioned as sub-text in Furman, Coker, and other early cases,
it functioned directly as text—that is, it played an open and starring role—in
McCleskey v. Kemp.51 In McCleskey, the petitioner introduced a sophisticated
study showing that even controlling for a plethora of other factors, race played
a significant role in determining who was sentenced to death under Georgia’s
capital sentencing scheme.52 Relying on this study, the petitioner asserted that
Georgia’s capital punishment statute violated both the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause53 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s

carried out since 1976—overlap considerably with the southern states that had the highest
incidence of extra-legal violence and killings during the Jim Crow era.”
Id. at 18.
47
408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman, the Supreme Court struck down Georgia’s death penalty
statute (and, by extension, that of all other states at the time) on Eighth Amendment grounds. Id.
239–40.
48
433 U.S. 584 (1977).
49
Id. at 597 (finding death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for the crime of rape).
50
See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 46, at 27 (noting that despite Coker’s explicit argument
concerning racial discrimination in imposition of the death penalty for rape, the Supreme Court
“completely sidestepped the racial issue” in its opinion striking down Georgia’s statute); cf. Carol
S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, but the Center Holds: The Supreme Court and the Death Penalty,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1487 (2002) (“Because black men who raped white women were
extraordinarily more likely to receive the death penalty than any other racial combination,
Coker’s elimination of the death penalty for rape, although formally premised entirely on
grounds of proportionality, managed to eliminate the most racially disproportionate use of capital
punishment at the same time.”) (emphasis added).
51
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
52
Id. at 286–87 (describing a study “show[ing] a disparity in the imposition of the death
sentence in Georgia based on the race of the murder victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the
defendant.”).
53
Id. at 299.
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Equal Protection Clause.54 Faced with this direct challenge, the Court simply
pointed out its many attempts to reduce the influence of race in the capital
sentencing process and noted other features of Georgia’s statute that reduced
the risk that arbitrary factors such as race would influence sentencing
outcomes.55 Essentially, the Court threw up its hands and declined to issue a
sweeping ruling.
Race has also functioned as text in the Court’s death penalty
jurisprudence concerning discrete legal issues (i.e., those in which sweeping
rulings are not necessary). For example, Batson v. Kentucky bars the use of
peremptory challenges based on race.56 Under Batson, prosecutors must offer
race-neutral explanations for their peremptory challenges, after which the court
must determine whether the defendant has established purposeful
discrimination.57 Turner v. Murray, a capital case, held that in cases involving
interracial crimes, the defendant has a right to voir dire on the issue of potential
jurors’ racial bias.58 In justifying this holding, the Court specifically noted that
“the risk that racial prejudice may have infected petitioner’s capital sentencing
[was] unacceptable in light of the ease with which that risk, being especially
serious in view of the finality of the death sentence, could have been
minimized.”59
At their best, Batson, Turner, and their progeny should prevent
conscious and deliberate racial bias by prosecutors, defense lawyers, and
potential jurors.60

54

Id. at 291.
See id. at 309–10 (“Because of the risk that the factor of race may enter the criminal justice
process, we have engaged in ‘unceasing efforts’ to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal
justice system.”); see also id. at 309–11 (describing various safeguards against the influence of
arbitrary factors in capital sentencing).
56
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231
(2005) (explaining application of Batson standard).
57
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
58
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
59
Id. at 36.
60
There is, of course, considerable anecdotal evidence that Batson has not succeeded in
preventing consciously race-based peremptory challenges by prosecutors. Perhaps one of the
most infamous examples of this concerns the training session held for prosecutors in the
Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office approximately a year after Batson. One of the major
subjects of the video was how to strike as many black jurors as possible while offering raceneutral explanations that would survive scrutiny. See McMahon DA Training Video,
GOOGLE.COM, http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-5102834972975877286 (last visited
Sept. 17, 2012). Professor Michelle Alexander describes the ease with which prosecutors craft
race-neutral explanations:
[O]ne comprehensive study reviewed all published decisions involving
Batson challenges from 1986 to 1992 and concluded that prosecutors almost
never fail to successfully craft acceptable race-neutral explanations to justify
striking black jurors. Courts accept explanations that jurors are too young,
55
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Even assuming—and this is a large and unwarranted assumption—that
Batson, Turner, and similar cases work effectively and optimally to prevent
conscious racial discrimination in jury selection and allow for dismissal for
cause of potential jurors with conscious racial biases, a wealth of empirical
evidence strongly suggests that race still matters. Research suggests that
blacks—particularly blacks accused of killing whites—are judged more harshly
and are more likely to be sentenced to death than are similarly situated whites.61
But why?
I assert (but am not unique in doing so) that the interplay of two factors
accounts for the disparate sentencing treatment of blacks who kill whites. First,
the implicit, unconscious biases of the trial’s actors—judge, attorneys,
witnesses, and jurors—color how jurors hear and interpret evidence and how
jurors see the defendant, and these unconscious biases disadvantage black
defendants. Second, the narratives presented during capital trials and American
cultural narratives concerning crime generally “confirm” (or prime)62 jurors’
unconscious biases.
In short, if the current rules of criminal procedure (including
constitutionally required rules, such as that of Turner v. Murray)63 successfully
prevent consciously racist peremptory challenges by prosecutors as well as the
placement of consciously racist jurors on a capital jury, then one might
suppose—as apparently the law does—that a black or other minority capital
defendant generally would receive the same sentence as a similarly situated
white defendant. But we know that isn’t the case, at least in cases involving
black defendants and white victims: All else being equal, the black defendant

too old, too conservative, too liberal, too comfortable, or too
uncomfortable. . . . Even explanations that might correlate with race, such as
lack of education, unemployment, poverty, being single, living in the same
neighborhood as the defendant, or prior involvement with the criminal justice
system—have all been accepted as perfectly good, non-pretextual excuses for
striking African Americans from juries.
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 119 (2010).
61
There is a voluminous body of literature on this question. Although the race of the
defendant standing alone is not necessarily significant, the post-1990 studies generally
“document race-of-victim disparities reflecting more punitive treatment of white-victim cases
among similarly aggravated cases” and also suggest that “cases involving black defendants and
white victims are treated more punitively than cases of all other defendant/victim racial
combinations.” See David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the
Administration of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special
Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL.194 (2003).
62
See Levinson , supra note 14, at 608 (discussing stereotype priming).
63

Turner, 476 U.S. 28 (finding capital defendants have a right to voir dire questions
concerning potential jurors’ racial prejudices).
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typically fares worse.64 Dismissing overt racism as a cause, what accounts for
the difference?
Modern cognitive psychologists would say, quite simply, that the legal
system’s exclusive focus on conscious bias is naïve and incomplete because it
ignores both (a) the unconscious, or implicit, nature of most bias, including
racial bias, and (b) the primacy of unconscious biases in decision-making and
in judgments about persons and behavior.65 What follows is a brief summary of
some of the research of cognitive scientists on racial schemas, implicit biases,
and the effect of such schemas and biases on behavior.66 Following the general
description of these concepts is some discussion of how these concepts may
operate in a capital trial.
A.

Introduction to Schemas

We humans simplify our world through the use of schemas. Humans
are presented with an overwhelming amount of information and sensory data,
and schemas allow us to organize this information into discrete and
recognizable categories and to determine quickly what to think and feel about
those categories. The technical definition is as follows: “A schema is a
‘cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of
stimulus, including its attributes, and the relations among those attributes.’”67
Many cognitive psychologists would say we have particular exemplars in mind
for certain things and that we fit items into a schema based on how closely the
items resemble the exemplar.68 For example, a lion might more readily fit our
schema for mammal than does the dolphin, although both are mammals. At
times, we use mapping rules to determine the category (or schema) into which
to place an object or person, and we then ascribe certain meanings (both
cognitive and affective) based on the category into which we have placed the
item.69
Take pie, for instance. It’s possible that some groups might not have a
schema (or mental category) for pie; that is, the group might have a larger
schema for dessert, but not for the sub-category pie. When confronted with an

64

See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 61, at 194.
See infra Part II.
66
As the footnotes in this section will indicate, here I rely heavily on two excellent articles
that provide a far more comprehensive discussion of these issues. See Kang, supra note 36;
Levinson, supra note 14.
67
Kang, supra note 36, at 1498 (quoting SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL
COGNITION 98 (2d ed. 1991)).
68
See id. at 1498 n.40 (describing prototype model for understanding schemas, which
“emphasizes a core conception of the category that is created by some summary or average
representation of every element in that category”).
69
See id. at 1499–1500 (discussing mapping rules and meanings in context of race).
65
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object that might be pie or might be something else, we use mapping rules to
decide whether the object is pie: Is the object round? Does it appear to have a
flaky crust with some kind of filling? Is the object edible? Is it sweet? Note that
mapping rules can quickly differentiate seemingly similar items: if, for
example, the round, edible object with a flaky crust is filled with eggs, cheese,
and vegetables, we might place it into our schema for quiche rather than for pie.
Once we have mapped the item into a category, we assign cognitive and
affective meanings to the item based on our schema for that item. A cognitive
meaning we might assign to pie could be high in calories; an affective meaning
might be pleasure! happy!
Cognitive scientists have found that “schematic thinking operates
automatically, nearly instantaneously.”70 When we encounter a pie, we
generally don’t have to think about our mapping rules, nor do we have to
remember to be happy to encounter the pie. Moreover, it should be obvious that
the meanings we assign can be incorrect either in discrete cases or even across
an entire class: there are a few low calorie and bad-tasting pies out there. Still,
the schema and the meanings we assign determine our default settings as to any
item within that class.
Importantly, we use schemas not only for objects and items, but for
human beings.71 For example, we have schemas for men and women, with
automatic mapping rules.72 We have schemas for jocks, nerds, cheerleaders,
bankers, etc.
And at least in this culture, we have schemas for race.
B.

The Prevalence and Influence of Racial Schemas

Research indicates that racial schemas exist and that they matter. As
Professor Justin Levinson asserts, “the human mind makes unintentional, but
powerful and biased, associations based on gender, race, and ethnicity . . . .”73
Moreover, “these automatic associations are meaningful, and influence decision
making and behavior.”74

70

Id. at 1499.
Id. (“When we encounter a person, we classify that person into numerous social categories,
such as gender, (dis)ability, age, race, and role.”).
72
Part of the fun (and frustration) of the old Saturday Night Live skit about Pat (remember
Pat?) was that Pat didn’t fit our exemplar for man or for woman, and the traditional mapping
rules for gender simply didn’t work: The name, voice, height, clothing, and physical features
simply didn’t make it clear whether Pat was a man or a woman. Given that, viewers didn’t know
what meanings to assign to Pat.
See Pat (Saturday Night Live), WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pat_(Saturday_Night_Live) (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
73
Levinson, supra note 14, at 605.
74
Id.
71

WILKINS (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/24/2012 4:59 PM

CONFRONTING THE INVISIBLE WITNESS

319

A number of experiments by social and cognitive psychologists have
demonstrated the pervasive implicit racial biases held by many, if not most,
Americans. One well known such experiment is Project Implicit, site of the
Implicit Association Test (IAT).75 The Implicit Association Test “pairs an
attitude object (such as a racial group) with an evaluative dimension (good or
bad) and tests how response accuracy and speed indicate implicit and automatic
attitudes and stereotypes.”76 The idea is that “tasks are performed well when
they rely on well-practiced associations between objects and attributes,”77 but
are performed poorly when “weakly associated [objects] and attributes share
the same response key.”78
Based on their analysis of hundreds of thousands of Implicit
Association Tests, researchers have concluded that almost seventy percent of
participants “demonstrated an implicit preference for ‘White People’ versus
‘Black People.’”79 As a practical matter, this means that a substantial majority
(approximately 70%) of people who took the test had more positive schemas
for whites than for blacks and, conversely, more negative schemas for blacks
than for whites. Generally, the data from the Implicit Association Test are
consistent with three broad principles of social psychology:
1) “[S]ocially dominant groups have implicit bias against
subordinate groups.”80
2) Ingroup Favoritism: Persons have a more automatic
association of positive traits with one’s own group.81
3) Outgroup Derogation: Persons have a tendency to associate
negative characteristics with outgroups more easily than with
ingroups.82

75
Links to the Implicit Association Tests and research associated with those tests may be
found online at IAT Corp., PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit (last visited
Sept. 17, 2012).
76
Levinson, supra note 14, at 610–11.
77
Id. (quoting Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit
Association Test, 10 GRP. PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359, 359 (2007)).
78
Id. at 611 (quoting Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of
Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked
Individuals 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803 (2001)).
79
Id. at 612 (citing Brian Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and
Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36 (2008)).
80
Kang, supra note 36, at 1512.
81
82

Id.
Id.
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Given these general principles, and given the minority status and history of
African Americans, one hardly should be surprised that most test-takers
exhibited automatic implicit preferences for whites.
Importantly, the evidence is overwhelming that “implicit bias measures
are dissociated from explicit bias measures.”83 In other words, a person may
sincerely deny having any conscious racial biases—may, in fact, be deeply
committed to principles of equality and racial justice—but nonetheless harbor
implicit, automatic biases against African Americans.
Perhaps even more importantly, implicit racial biases (our automatic
schemas regarding race) influence what we perceive (perception), how we
interpret what we perceive (interpretation), and how we act (behavior). First,
several experiments have found a relationship between implicit biases and what
we actually perceive. For example, in one experiment testing implicit biases not
concerning race, students were introduced to a person, described as a “student,
demonstrator, lecturer, senior lecturer, or professor.”84 Students later were
asked to guess the person’s height, and “the higher the social status, the taller
the guessed height.”85
Second, experiments dating back to the 1970’s also have demonstrated
a link between our implicit biases and how we interpret information.86 For
example, Professor Jerry Kang describes an experiment in which high quality
resumes were assigned either “white” names or stereotypically “black”
names.87 The high quality resumes with stereotypically “white” names
received 50% more callbacks than those with “black” names,88 leading one to
conclude our implicit racial schemas affect our interpretations of quality of
credentials.89 Other experiments have shown that subjects are more likely to
interpret ambiguous expressions and gestures as aggressive and hostile when
the expressions and gestures are performed by black (as opposed to white)
characters.90

83

Id.
Id. at 1504 n.68.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 1515–16 nn.117–27.
87
Id. at 1515–16.
88
Id.
89
This is only one of a wealth of such experiments. Similar experiments have demonstrated
effects for gender biases, etc. See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Implicit Gender
Bias in the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 16–17
(2010) (describing experiment concerning evaluation of Curriculum Vitae (CVs) for male and
female job candidates).
90
See Kang, supra note 36, at 1515 n.117 (citing H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield,
Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and White Children’s Perceptions of Ambiguously
Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 593–95 (1980)).
84
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Finally, several experiments have linked our behavior to implicit
biases. For example, one experiment found scores on the Implicit Association
Test predicted how persons would allocate budget cuts among student
organizations.91 Moreover, a “meta-analysis of IAT studies concluded that IAT
scores predicted a variety of behaviors, such as voting [and] consumer
choice . . . .”92 In fact, such implicit biases generally predict behavior more
accurately than do our explicit beliefs and commitments regarding race (and
other factors).93
C.

Activation and Functioning of Racial Schemas

“In interpersonal encounters, multiple schemas may be activated.”94
For example, a person may be a heterosexual, female, Latina engineer, and
persons likely have schemas for heterosexual, woman, Latina, and engineer.
Some of the content of the schemas may conflict: in American culture, for
example, one might expect the schema for women to include “not good at
math,” but one would expect the schema for engineers to include “very good at
math.” Given such actual and potential conflicts, which schemas influence
perception and behavior? And how does this affect our racial schemas?
As Professor Kang points out, “[w]hich schemas actively influence [an]
interaction depend on numerous variables, such as primacy (what gets activated
first), salience (which schema cues catch attention), accessibility (which
schemas can be retrieved in memory easily, perhaps because of recent
priming), and individuating information.”95
Perhaps not surprisingly, “the scientific consensus is that racial
schemas are not of minor significance.”96 Differently put, they are likely to
influence many—perhaps most—interactions. Contrast race with sexual
orientation. A person may have implicit negative biases regarding both blacks
and gays and lesbians, but racial schemas probably are more easily triggered. A
racial schema is likely to have both primacy and salience: “[W]e as observers

91

See Levinson, supra note 14, at 612–13 nn.80–87 and accompanying text.
Id. at 613.
93
See Kang, supra note 36, at 1514 (“There is now persuasive evidence that implicit biases
against a social category, as measured by instruments such as the IAT [Implicit Association
Test], predicts disparate behavior toward individuals mapped to that category.”); see also
Levinson, supra note 14, at 612–13 (describing research findings that “implicit associations and
stereotypes . . . predict discriminatory decision making and behavior” and that the IAT was a
“better predictor of hiring decisions, verbal and non-verbal pro-social indicators, and other
behaviors” than were self-reports of explicit bias).
94
Kang, supra note 36, at 1502.
92

95
96

Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1502.
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are especially sensitive to visible and physical cues,”97 and a person’s apparent
racial category often will be accessible upon first sight of the person (or, less
frequently, upon hearing a voice or learning a name). In contrast, with gays and
lesbians, most persons with implicit biases against gays have been exposed to
some individuating information about the gay person before learning the
person’s sexual orientation; that is, other schemas may have been activated
first.
Moreover, particular schemas or stereotypes may be “primed”
(activated or prepared for activation), and this priming can be direct or indirect.
Professor Levinson has summarized a series of fascinating experiments on
stereotype priming. In an example of direct priming, a group of Caucasian and
African American students were asked to identify their race just before taking a
test. Remarkably, “African-American participants took longer to answer
questions and achieved lower overall scores relative to Caucasian participants,
but only when they were primed.”98 In an example of indirect priming, two
groups of senior citizens were given a series of words to unscramble. Both
series of words contained many neutral words, but one of the series also
contained words stereotypically associated with the elderly (e.g., wise, bingo,
etc.). Of course, neither group was told anything specific about the elderly or
about the content of the word lists. The group indirectly “primed” with
stereotypes of the old was found to walk more slowly down a hallway after the
experiment than did the group not primed with such stereotypes.99
Interestingly, priming some stereotypes of a group can activate other
unrelated stereotypes of that group. For example, a group primed with violent
rap music, which primed stereotypes of black males as aggressive and violent,
“were more likely than other participants to judge a Black job applicant as less
qualified for a job requiring intelligence”100 [lower intelligence being another
stereotype pertaining to blacks].
In sum, implicit biases and stereotypes typically operate automatically,
generally influence behavior, and can be activated both directly and indirectly.
Moreover, in part because a person’s supposed racial category typically is
easily identifiable visually, racial schemas often play a significant role in
interactions. But what is the content of such schemas or stereotypes, and why is
it relevant to capital litigation?
D.

The Origin and Content of Racial Schemas

Many groups are stereotyped in ways that are positive, negative, or
neutral. Even indirect priming for the neutral or positive stereotypes concerning
97
98
99
100

Id. at 1503.
Levinson, supra note 14, at 608.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 632.
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a group can, at least in some people, activate the other, negative stereotypes of
this group.101 For example, when primed with a neutral or positive stereotype
about African American males—say, that they are good athletes—other, more
negative stereotypes of African Americans may be activated in some persons.
That said, the more negative stereotypes of African Americans—and, in
particular, of African American males—are the primary points of concern for
capital defendants who are themselves African American. Several questions
arise: What is the content of these negative stereotypes? What are the sources
of such stereotypes? And what are the effects of such stereotypes?
There’s one major negative stereotype: many persons implicitly
associate black males with anger and violence.102 Various studies show many
persons draw a strong association between black males and guns. For example,
in one well-known study, persons were faster to recognize guns and frequently
mistook tools for guns when primed with pictures of black male faces.103 This
was true without regard to the conscious prejudice of the subject of the test.104
Scholars have opined that “the stereotype of African-Americans as violent and
criminally inclined is one of the most pervasive, well-known, and persistent
stereotypes in American culture. Where other negative cultural stereotypes
about Blacks have significantly diminished, this one has remained strong and
influential, particularly among Whites.”105
The stereotype of black males as angry, violent, and disposed to crime
has both macro- and micro-effects. On a macro level, many of these stereotypes

101

See, e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social
Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1249–50 (2002) (“Words associated with the negative
features of a stereotype will activate the stereotype in persons of both low and high [conscious]
prejudice. Associated words that are positive or neutral will activate the stereotype only in more
prejudiced people.”). One of the scientific theories explaining this phenomenon posits that our
brains function like networks and process information in connection to other information: “In
connectionist models, the elements that constitute thought processes are not evaluated or
processed individually, but are activated in relation to the other elements in the network.” Id. at
1259 (citation omitted). For example, people shown a yellow canary and then asked to name a
fruit are more likely than others to name lemons or bananas. Id. at 1260. The connectionist model
generates powerful predictions. For example, “[c]onnectionist models would . . . predict that the
kind of music playing when a witness sees an ambiguous object may affect whether the witness
‘sees’ a gun or a pair of pliers in the first few moments of perception.” Id. at 1263.
102
See Kang, supra note 36, at 1491 nn.3–5 and accompanying text (describing experiment by
social psychologist John Bargh). For example, persons primed with a picture of a black male
reacted with greater anger and hostility to a computer crash than those primed with a face of a
white male. Id.
103
See Blasi, supra note 101, at 1248; see also Kang, supra note 36, at 1493 (describing
another experiment concerning shooter bias).
104
See Blasi, supra note 101, at 1249.
105
Mona Lynch, Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Life-and-Death Decision Making: Lessons from
Laypersons in an Experimental Setting, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 43, at 188.
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drive policy discussions: “[T]here is powerful evidence that it is the stereotypes
Whites possess of Black men as violent that drives White attitudes about
crime.”106 On a micro level, these (implicit) stereotypes may color opinions
concerning appropriate punishment; for example, Professor Kang cites one
study in which persons primed with a Black suspect’s mug shot during a
newscast supported more punitive remedies than those primed with a White
suspect’s mug shot.107 One intriguing (and deeply disheartening) study found
that black defendants with stereotypically black features were sentenced to
death at much higher rates than were blacks with less stereotypical features.108
As to the source of these implicit biases and racial meanings, Professor
Kang notes they stem from both direct and vicarious experiences.109 Vicarious
experiences can include statements from friends and family, news reports,
depictions in television shows and movies, etc. Moreover, “[e]ven if direct
experience with racial minorities more powerfully shapes our schemas,
vicarious experiences may well dominate in terms of sheer quantity and
frequency.”110 Available evidence strongly suggests the news media—
especially the local news media—contribute to and prime stereotypes of black
males: “[A]mple evidence shows that the media treats Black-perpetrator stories
differently, representing and portraying suspects in a more threatening manner
than comparable White perpetrators.”111 Moreover, the local news media tends
to devote a disproportionate amount of time to crime stories,112 and at least one
study found that “greater viewing of local news led to . . . more . . . racism.”113
Much research has noted the “continuing media portrayal of African Americans
as aggressive criminals . . . .”114 In fact, according to Benjamin Fleury-Steiner,
“the media’s and politicians’ hyper-focus on blacks as criminals . . . reproduces

106

Blasi, supra note 101, at 1274.
Kang, supra note 36, at 1491–92. Importantly, apart from skin hue, the two mug shots were
actually of the same face (with the same expression, etc.). Id. at 1492; see also Levinson, supra
note 14, at 629 (describing study in which “participants who viewed news stories featuring
mostly Black suspects were more likely to make harsh culpability judgments of a raceunidentified criminal. . . . Race need not be specifically mentioned in order to activate racial
stereotypes . . . .”).
108
Levinson, supra note 14, at 628.
109
Kang, supra note 36, at 1539–40.
110
Id. at 1540.
111
Id. at 1563.
112
Id. at 1550 (“[T]ime allocated to crime stories does not correlate with changes in crime
rates.”).
113
Id. at 1553 (describing study that ultimately found that “greater viewing of local news led
to greater support for punitive remedies, more old-fashioned racism, and more ‘new racism’”).
114
Levinson, supra note 14, at 627.
107
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the same pre-Civil Rights ideology: whites are law-abiding, and blacks are
lawless.”115
As the next section will discuss, these automatic and implicit
stereotypes concerning African-Americans almost certainly affect jurors’
capital sentencing decisions.
E.

The Activation and Application of Racial Schemas in Capital
Sentencing

Although I am unaware of any psychological studies confirming the
operation of racial schemas (independent of other factors) in capital
sentencing,116 the data from the Capital Jury Project, experiments conducted by
criminology professor Mona Lynch and psychology professor Craig Haney,
and plain old common sense suggest that these schemas nearly certainly affect
capital sentencing in ways that disadvantage black males.
First, there’s the argument from common sense: If these schemas
generally operate automatically and can be activated both directly and
indirectly, there is no reason whatsoever to suppose there is an invisible wall
keeping the schemas out of capital trials. In fact, there is every reason to
believe they might operate strongly in capital trials. By their very nature,
capital trials concern violent crime, an area stereotypically associated with
black males.117 One might reasonably think any discussion of violent crime—
even assuming the discussion is facially race-neutral—might prime stereotypes,

115
Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, Death in “Whiteface”: Modern Race Minstrels, Official
Lynching, and the Culture of American Apartheid, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE:
RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 43, at 156.
116
Please note that I am focusing here only on capital sentencing. Of course, there is every
reason to believe that racial schemas infect virtually every stage of a capital trial, from the
decision to seek death, to jury selection, to interpretations of evidence during the guilt phase of
trial, etc. See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection
and the Eighth Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial
Discrimination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2083, 2102 (2004) (arguing, inter alia, that because
“the decisions [whether to seek the death penalty] fall to the subjective judgment of the
prosecutor, potential abounds for unconscious racial biases to influence outcomes”); see also
Antony Page, Batson’s Blind Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85
B.U. L. REV. 155, 156 (2005) (arguing that given the automatic and implicit operation of racial
and gender schemas, “the Batson peremptory challenge framework is woefully ill-suited to
address the problem of race and gender discrimination in jury selection”); cf. Jeffrey K. Pokorak,
Probing the Capital Prosecutor’s Perspective: Race of the Discretionary Actors, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1811, 1818–19 (1998) (“[T]he prosecutors with ultimate charging discretion in death
penalty states are almost entirely white. . . . The first and most obvious channel for this
[unconscious] bias arises from the racial disparity between the prosecutors and the death row
population. The predominantly white prosecutors are more likely to have absorbed the ‘cultural
stereotype’ of black inferiority and thus perceive black defendants as more ‘violent’ and more
‘dangerous’ than their white counterparts.”).
117
See supra notes 102–105 and accompanying text.
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leading to changes in how jurors perceive all the data in the trial. Indeed,
Professor Levinson has hypothesized that the very death qualification process
might activate racial stereotypes, given the long historical relationship between
race and the death penalty.118 Moreover, prosecutors may prime racial
stereotypes during capital trials involving black defendants.119
Recent studies buttress the common sense conclusion that implicit
biases affect capital sentencing. One small study showed that even death
penalty defense lawyers—a population one would expect to be racially
sensitive and consciously committed to racial justice and equality—harbor the
same implicit biases held by most of the rest of the American population.120 Of
course, this does not “prove that their performance [as defense counsel] is
impaired by [such] attitudes,”121 but it does not disprove it either. Similarly, a
study of Implicit Association Tests taken by trial judges indicates a “strong
white preference among the white judges.”122 Although these automatic
preferences do not translate automatically into unconscious discriminatory
behavior, they certainly can.123 I am unaware of any study of the implicit biases
of prosecutors, but why should one expect any significant differences? Putting
it all together, common sense suggests that if the advocates, judges, and jurors
in capital cases generally possess implicit racial biases, there is a distinct
likelihood those biases will seep into the capital sentencing process.
Moreover, data from the Capital Jury Project suggest the influence of
racial schemas and of other cognitive in-group/out-group processes in jurors’

118

Levinson, supra note 14, at 626–27.
For an example of a prosecutor’s priming of racial stereotypes, see Austin Sarat, Speaking
of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 19, 27 (1993):
Although the prosecutor denied the significance of race (“This isn’t black
versus white . . .”), the imagery on which he consistently relied was a racial
imagery. Sometimes the imagery was overt, as in his repeated references to
the fact that [the African-American defendant] had led his life in “dark
places”; sometimes it was more indirect, as in the contrast between those,
like [the white female victim], who embrace the “American way, play by the
rules, and work hard,” and those, like [the African-American male
defendant], who are “mean and lazy.”
Id.
120
See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty
Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1553 (2004) (analyzing results of IATs and concluding that
“capital defense attorneys, both trial and post-conviction (trial lawyers and habeas lawyers), look
like our [student control group] in their implicit attitudes about race and, as far as we can tell,
pretty much like the rest of the population. White men have the strongest automatic preference
for white, followed by white women.”).
121
Id. at 1542.
122
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1210 (2009).
119

123

See id. at 1221 (concluding, inter alia, that “implicit biases can affect judges’ judgment, at
least in contexts where judges are unaware of a need to monitor their decisions for racial bias”).
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decision-making.124 Capital Jury Project data suggest three major differences
between black and white jurors on issues relevant to the life-or-death decision
during the capital sentencing trial.125 First, to a greater degree than white jurors,
black jurors experienced and were influenced by residual doubt (lingering
doubts, notwithstanding the guilty verdict, that the defendant was truly
responsible for the murder at issue).126 Black jurors in black-on-white capital
murder cases (and, to a lesser degree, in other cases) “were far and away the
most likely to have lingering doubts and to regard such doubts as important in
making the punishment decision.”127 Whites typically were not afflicted with
such doubts and also were less likely to consider them important to
sentencing.128
Second, black and white jurors differed in their findings concerning
defendants’ remorsefulness. Specifically, “[b]eliefs that the defendant was
remorseful for the crime were more common among black than white jurors
and most common among black jurors in [black-on-white] cases.”129 White
jurors in cases involving black defendants (regardless the race of the victim)
were “especially likely to see the defendant as lacking remorse.”130 Differences
in judgments concerning remorse are especially important given the
documented association between jurors’ beliefs regarding a defendant’s
remorse and their “receptivity to arguments of mitigation and their willingness
to grant mercy.”131
Third, black and white jurors differed in their opinions regarding
defendants’ future dangerousness. The data from the Capital Jury Project
indicate that jurors’ assessments of future dangerousness are central to
decisions regarding punishment, even in jurisdictions (unlike, say, Texas) in
which future dangerousness is not an explicit sentencing factor.132 White jurors
not only “appeared to believe that black defendants are more dangerous than
white defendants”133 but also appeared to rely much more heavily during

124
For an extensive discussion of the role of capital jurors’ race in capital decision-making,
see generally Bowers et al., supra note 45. Although this study and the Capital Jury Project data
upon which it relies are a little old, the information is sufficiently relevant and useful that it
merits a somewhat more extensive discussion.
125
Id. at 203.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 207.
128
Id. at 208.
129
Id. at 215.
130
Id. at 216.
131
Id. at 211.
132
133

Id. at 224.
Id. at 222.
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sentencing on considerations regarding future dangerousness.134 Moreover,
future dangerousness actually was discussed more during deliberations in
black-on-white cases than in white-on-white cases.135
Notably—and somewhat related to the differences concerning residual
doubt, remorse, and future dangerousness136—in certain kinds of cases there
was a gap in empathy for the defendant. Except in the black-on-white cases,
“jurors’ identification with the defendant was not race-specific.”137 Perhaps not
surprisingly, in the black-on-white cases, black jurors showed the highest
degree of identification with the defendant,138 and white jurors were “especially
unlikely to be reminded of someone by the defendant or to place themselves in
the situation of the defendant’s family in such cases.”139
Given the research on implicit stereotypes and biases, the results of the
Capital Jury Project studies are hardly surprising. Take, for example, the future
dangerousness question. If the evidence concerning future dangerousness was
ambiguous, one might expect white jurors to fall back on racial schemas—
implicit default settings—associating black men with violence and crime, i.e.,
with danger. Such a finding also would be consistent with the principle of
outgroup derogation, that is, the tendency more easily to associate negative
traits with outgroups than with ingroups.140 Such a finding also is consistent
with what is known as the “‘ultimate attribution error—the tendency to accept
the good for the ingroup and the bad for the outgroup as personal and
dispositional, but more important, to explain away the bad for the ingroup and
the good for the outgroup with situational attributions.’”141 In short, one would
expect white jurors, whose implicit biases would treat black males as an
outgroup, to see the defendant’s act of violence as a stable character trait rather
than a function of situational factors.
Finally, two sophisticated experiments conducted by Professors Lynch
and Haney strongly suggest racial schemas are hard at work during capital
sentencing. A full discussion of the experiments is beyond the scope of this
Article, but a few factors emerge as significant. First, the race of the defendant
played a significant role in the sentencing decisions in both experiments: both
individual jurors and juries as a body were more likely to impose death

134

Id. at 225.
Id. at 224.
136
See, e.g., id. at 218 (“Jurors’ impressions of the defendant’s remorsefulness, their personal
identification with the defendant, and their feelings that the defendant deserved mercy were
interrelated.”).
137
Id. at 217.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 242.
135

140
141

See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Kang, supra note 36, at 1566 (citation omitted).
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sentences upon black defendants.142 More important than the influence of race
upon ultimate outcome was its influence upon how jurors viewed the evidence.
Although the jurors in the experiment heard the very same mitigating evidence
regarding the defendant’s horrifically abusive childhood, psychological
difficulties during adult life, and positive traits as an older brother, husband,
and father, jurors assessed that evidence differently based solely on the race of
the defendant. Generally, this evidence had less mitigating value for jurors
when the defendant was black, particularly when the crime was a black-onwhite crime.143 In fact, jurors treated mitigating evidence as aggravating more
often with black than with white defendants.144
Second, one of the experiments found that the facts of the crime itself,
which were the primary aggravating circumstance in the case, were “weighed
more heavily toward death in the case of the Black defendant than the White
defendant.”145 In other words, jurors considered a crime more “death-worthy”
based simply on the race of the defendant.
Third, racial effects were magnified when the jury instructions were
not well understood, with life sentences more likely (than would be the case
with well understood instructions) for white defendants and death sentences
more likely for black defendants.146 This magnification effect was predictable
because research shows that reliance on racial stereotypes (schemas) increases
in ambiguous situations presenting high cognitive demands.147
As was true of the Capital Jury Project data, the qualitative data from
these experiments—specifically, the answers to a set of open-ended

142
Lynch, supra note 105, at 194–96. As Lynch noted, most studies of actual capital cases
show a race-of-victim effect. In the experiments by Haney and Lynch, race-of-victim served as
an amplifier: that is, “the greatest differences between groups were consistently evident in the
two cross-racial [black-on-white and white-on-black] condition comparisons.” Id. at 200. Lynch
further opined that the “race of victim effect may have been attenuated due to our approach, in
which we manipulated only race, and no other variables, resulting in a suppression of the
correlates to race that exist in the real world.” Id.
143
See id. at 194. Lynch states as follows:
When assessed by condition, comparisons revealed significant differences for
the weight given to all of the individual pieces of mitigating evidence, based
on the racial characteristics of the conditions. In the condition where the
White defendant kills a Black victim, significantly more weight was given in
favor of life on all of the mitigation compared to other conditions. Jurors’
assessments of three of the four mitigating circumstances . . . revealed the
influence of race in that these pieces of evidence or testimony were weighted
significantly more in favor of life for the White defendant.”
Id.
144
Id. at 195.
145
Id. at 197.
146
Id. at 195.
147

Id. (relying in part on Kerry Kawakami et al., Racial Prejudice and Stereotype Activation,
24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL., 407, 407–16 (1998)).
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questions—reflected a “withholding of empathy for the Black defendant, and
indeed some resentment that such a sentiment was sought for him.”148 Even in
those instances in which jurors found the mitigating evidence powerful in the
black defendant’s case, their responses did not reflect the same degree of
identification with him as was the case when this mitigating evidence was used
in the white defendant’s case.149
In short, common sense, empirical data about capital juries, and
psychological experiments all suggest that racial schemas influence capital
sentencing in a variety of ways, including how jurors view mitigating evidence
about childhood, mental health, etc.; whether jurors see the defendant as
remorseful; how jurors assess a defendant’s future dangerousness; and the
degree of and influence of residual doubt in jurors’ sentencing decisions. The
common thread appears to be an absence of empathy for the (perceived) Other.
What (if anything) can be done to reduce jurors’ implicit racial biases?
F.

Research on Countering Implicit Bias

Although humans will continue to think schematically about race and
about other categories, racial meanings, that is, the cognitive and affective
content of the particular (implicit) racial schemas, can change over time as
there are cultural and other shifts. Professor Kang points out the dramatic shift
in the cultural schema for Chinese immigrants:
At the end of the nineteenth century, the illegal immigration
problem in America had a Chinese face. The Chinese were
viewed as inscrutable, subhuman, incapable of higher learning;
useful laborers but otherwise despicable; vectors for disease,
filth, and immorality. And now, the racial meaning ascribed to
the very same body is often “model minority.” . . . [I]t would
be disingenuous to deny substantial transformations in both the
cognitive and affective content [of schemas] toward Asian
people. While explicit and implicit biases against that category
have by no means disappeared, they have transformed within
one lifetime.150
Although I certainly would welcome a shift in the negative content of
the implicit racial schemas concerning African-Americans, particularly black
males, long-term cultural shifts are beyond the scope of this Article. For
purposes of this Article, I assume that the implicit racial schemas of many
Americans (including many capital jurors) associate black males with criminal
violence, aggression, etc. The cognitive meaning assigned to the black male

148

Id. at 200 (emphasis added).

149

Id. at 198–99.
Kang, supra note 36, at 1532.

150
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category might be aggressive, violent, and angry; the affective association with
the black male category might be fear.
The question, then, is not whether the content of the schemas can be
changed entirely and permanently, but whether jurors’ implicit biases can be
neutralized or countered as the capital jury hears evidence and considers the
defendant’s sentence.151 As to this question, there is cause for cautious (and
very modest) optimism.
Researchers have identified a variety of ways the activation or
application of stereotypes may be inhibited at least temporarily. First, more
than one schema applies to most persons (someone may be an Asian female
mechanic, for example, and there are different schemas for Asian, female, and
mechanic), and causing people to focus principally on one of those
categories—mechanic, for example, “inhibits the activation of stereotypes
associated with another category.”152 Professor Kang notes that role schemas
may, at times, trump racial or gender schemas. When one sees an AfricanAmerican police officer, the schema for police officer typically assumes
primacy during any interaction.153
Second, the activation of stereotypes is dependent to a degree on
“emotion and . . . our sense of ourselves.”154 Events that increase self-esteem
reduce the likelihood that negative stereotypes are applied, and “events that
reduce self-esteem can increase the likelihood that negative stereotypes are
applied.”155 For example, persons praised by a black doctor will show less
implicit bias and fewer negative stereotypes of African Americans than persons
criticized by the black doctor.156 In explaining this phenomenon, Professor
Gary Blasi notes that “[a]lthough these phenomena take place below the level
of conscious processing, it is almost as if basic cognitive processes are looking
out for our subjective sense of well-being: We feel better if we can admire our
admirers and disparage our critics, subconsciously telling ourselves to consider

151

As will become clear, some of the potential methods for neutralizing jurors’ implicit biases
during trial actually may ultimately reinforce such biases in other settings. See Blasi, supra note
101, at 1246 (“Taking the [cognitive] science seriously might, at least in some contexts, privilege
short-term strategies or alter the calculation of tradeoffs.”). Whether to take steps that might have
such an effect is a question of values. I expect most advocates would privilege the interests of
their immediate client—someone facing a possible death sentence—over the interests in potential
long-term changes in racial schemas.
152
Id. Accordingly, though, inhibition of one stereotype under these conditions may cause a
“rebound” effect in the future; the suppression of a stereotype somehow leads to its
reinforcement in the future. Id.
153
Kang, supra note 36, at 1503 n.3.
154
Blasi, supra note 101, at 1250.
155
156

Id. at 1251.
See id. at 1250.
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the source.”157 In other words, because we want to believe the praise given us is
credible, we are less likely to activate stereotypes that would call the value of
the praise into question.
Third, just as one may prime racial, gender, and other such stereotypes,
there is reason to believe one can prime persons with ideals of fairness and
equality that might suppress, to a degree, racial and other stereotypes. Professor
Blasi cites a line of experiments suggesting “that it is possible to counter
stereotypes at the same preconscious level at which they are activated.”158 For
example, people primed with scrambled words associated with achievement
were more likely to persist in a problem-solving task (puzzles).159 “These
results suggest that priming subjects with fairness or egalitarian goals might
activate unconscious cognitions that would counter the effects of the automatic
activation of stereotypes . . . .”160
Fourth, exposure to or images of counter-stereotypical exemplars—
people who belong to the category in question (female, black, etc.) but whose
traits plainly do not conform to the stereotype of the group—may inhibit
activation of or may reduce implicit biases.161 Professor Kang describes an
experiment in which exposure to positive black exemplars “reduced . . .
implicit bias by more than half.”162 That said, some researchers would suggest
that exposure to so-called counter-stereotypical exemplars may lead to the
creation of sub-types or sub-categories while leaving the larger stereotype
untouched.163 Regardless, this line of research suggests either (or both) of two
strategies: (1) try to reduce implicit bias by exposing others to counterstereotypical exemplars, or (2) try to exempt one from implicit bias through
arguments that the person actually belongs to a sub-type to whom the
stereotype does not apply.
In the context of a capital sentencing trial, advocates necessarily must
use the tools of narrative to counter jurors’ (and perhaps the court’s) implicit
biases. Part III of this Article provides a brief overview of narrative and
metaphor, describes their typical use during capital sentencing trials, then
examines criticisms of their use in cases involving black and other minority
defendants.

157

Id.
Id. at 1254.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
See, e.g., Kang, supra note 36, at 1559.
162
Id. at 1558.
163
See Blasi, supra note 101, at 1268–69 (describing research suggesting that “when people
encounter a person who differs from a previously held stereotype, they tend not to change their
stereotype, but to create a new subtype to accommodate the exception”).
158
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III. THE ROLE OF NARRATIVE, COUNTER-NARRATIVE, AND METAPHOR IN
CAPITAL CASES
Narrative is central to law. Lawsuits—whatever the subject—
essentially are stories about things that went wrong—love gone bad, a deal
gone sour, yet another “somebody done somebody wrong song.”164 People may
disagree about what really happened or what it all means, but lawsuits always
concern something that happened. But what exactly is narrative? What
characterizes legal narratives? In what ways is narrative central to death penalty
cases in general and capital sentencing trials in particular? This section
explores these questions.
A.

Introduction to Narrative and Metaphor
1.

Narrative

The “recipe for making stories”165 typically contains five basic
ingredients: (1) scene or setting, (2) agent (the cast of characters), (3) action
(the plot), (4) agency (the means or instruments of action), and (5) purpose (the
motivations and goals of the characters).166 Of course, these ingredients must
blend well:167 a plot needs characters and a setting appropriate to that particular
plot line. Alvie Singer, the protagonist in Annie Hall,168 would be ill suited to a
traditional Western. Importantly, sometimes these five ingredients are
interchangeable.169 For example, a setting—take, say, the hotel in The
Shining170—may function effectively as both setting (abandoned hotel) and
character (villain causing the protagonist to go mad). Finally, narratives
generally contain “recurring melodies” within the plot line171—i.e., themes. For
the story to be believable there must be congruence between the theme and the
other five ingredients.172

164
B.J. THOMAS, (Hey Won’t You Play) Another Somebody Done Somebody Wrong Song, on
REUNION (ABC Records 1975), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ym_mJokfTQg
(last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
165
Ty Apler et al., Introduction to Stories Told and Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of the
First Rodney King Assault Trial, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 20 (2005).
166
Id. (citing KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES XV (1945)).
167
Id. at 21 (noting that the five dimensions of narrative “need to be in tune”).
168
ANNIE HALL (United Artists 1977).
169
Id.
170
THE SHINING (Warner Bros. 1980).
171
Philip N. Meyer, Vignettes from a Narrative Primer, 12 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 229, 260
(2006).
172
See JOHN GARDNER, THE ART OF FICTION: NOTES ON CRAFT FOR YOUNG WRITERS 70
(Vintage Books ed. 1991). According to John Gardner, an appropriate theme arises from within a
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There is a rich literature on storytelling (or narrative) and the law,173
but Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner’s revered Minding the Law174 has
wielded particular influence. According to Amsterdam and Bruner, of the five
dimensions of narrative, the two sine qua non are plot and characters.175
a.

Introduction to Plot

Trials, troubles, and tribulations are the stuff of plots. Indeed, “[t]he
launching pad of narrative is breach, a violation of expectations,
disequilibrium.”176 A typical plot has a beginning, middle, and end, and
consists of the following elements: (1) an initial steady state; (2) a disruption of
the steady state by some trouble (“Trouble”) “attributable to human agency or
susceptible to change by human intervention”;177 (3) “efforts at redress or
transformation, which succeed or fail”178 in remedying the Trouble; (4)
restoration to the former steady state or transformation to a newly created (but
different) steady state; and (5) a coda—the moral of the story.179 If
disequilibrium is narrative’s launching pad, the “landing pad . . . is balance, the
reestablishment of equilibrium.”180
We see this plot arc in movies and television all the time. Take Super
8,181 one of 2011’s summer features. As is often true, the story consists of
several narratives. One of the narratives in the movie begins with a steady state:
a group of boys on the verge of adolescence are making a zombie movie in
their sleepy Ohio steel mill town. Trouble then intrudes. After a spectacular
train wreck, strange things begin happening. The electricity is on, then off;
objects (car motors, appliances, etc.) go missing; people disappear; dogs run
away from town; the Air Force, tightlipped, shows up in search of something
unnamed. Initial efforts at redress fall woefully short. Once the source of the
Trouble is discerned—an alien captured and held hostage for years by the Air
Force was freed in the train wreck and is taking (and eating) people—there are
renewed efforts at redress. Attempts by the Air Force to kill or subdue the
creature fail spectacularly. The town returns to its steady state after one effort at
story; that is, there must be a close fit between the story actually told and the theme of the story.
Id. Without such a fit, either the theme or the story itself will lack believability and integrity. Id.
173
See generally Meyer note 171, at 238–40 (providing a list of useful sources on both
narrative and, more specifically, legal narrative).
174
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000).
175
Id. at 113.
176
Apler et al., supra note 165, at 6 (emphasis omitted).
177
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 174, at 113–14 (emphasis omitted).
178
Id. at 114.
179
Id.
180
181

Apler et al., supra note 165, at 6 (emphasis omitted).
SUPER 8 (Paramount Pictures 2011).

WILKINS (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/24/2012 4:59 PM

CONFRONTING THE INVISIBLE WITNESS

335

redress—namely, the pre-adolescent protagonist’s demonstration of empathy
for the creature—succeeds. And the alien, healed by the boy’s empathy, is able
to go home.
There are, of course, other kinds of plots. Some plots begin not with a
steady state, but in “incompleteness, distress, or disarray, and the goal is the
completion of an important task or the restoration of the normative world.”182
Journey narratives, such as that of Odysseus, follow this plot line.183 Again, one
of the narratives within Super 8 follows this pattern. The movie begins with the
funeral of the pre-adolescent protagonist’s mother following an accident at a
steel mill. Even before the action begins, the world of the boy and his father has
been disrupted, and one of the goals within the plot is their healing.
Certain stories enjoy special resonance within particular cultures.
Myth, that is, “archetype or other master story,”184 provides “ready templates
for plots.”185 Every culture has its myths or master stories as well as its stock
stories, and, in fact, humans have schemas for such stories. That is, “stories
embedded in our experience provide mental blueprints and cognitive
shortcuts.”186 “[T]hese myths practically run in our veins,”187 so when one of
our cultural master stories is activated, we “are inclined to see both events and
ideas as fitting into [these] archetypal stories.”188 In a trial, for example, when
jurors “perceive[] the familiar lineaments of [a stock script or story prevalent in
our culture] . . . [they are] cued to interpret other pieces of evidence and
eventually the whole of it consistently with the familiar story line.”189 The stock
story becomes a “cognitive framework for the jury’s interpretation of the
evidence.”190 That is, our plot schemas influence what we actually see and the
meanings we ascribe to these perceptions, and much information remains
unseen, unacknowledged, invisible.191 Although our master narratives serve
many positive ends—they make life more manageable—they also have the

182

Edwards, supra note 13, at 887.
Id. at 886.
184
Id. at 889. Another definition of “master story” is a narrative “that embodies the history
and traditions of a people.” Berger, supra note 12, at 268.
185
Edwards, supra note 13, at 890.
186
Linda L. Berger, The Lady, or the Tiger? A Field Guide to Metaphor and Narrative, 50
WASHBURN L.J. 275, 281 (2011).
187
Edwards, supra note 13, at 884.
188
Id. at 891.
189
Apler et al., supra note 165, at 7.
190
Id. at 16.
183

191

See, e.g., Berger, supra note 186, at 277 (noting that stories “unavoidably shape our
perceptions”).
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potential to “crowd out other points of view.”192 Within a culture, “master
narratives stand as the presumptive, default point of view.”193
For example, Professor Craig Haney has posited that American culture
contains a master narrative about the nature of violent crime in the United
States.194 This narrative is inhabited with a stock character, the violent criminal.
According to Haney, in this narrative:
[C]riminal behavior is understood as an individual-level
phenomenon that lacks an explanatory social context. Thus, . . .
individual lawbreakers are seen as the primary or exclusive
causal locus of criminal behavior; they alone are responsible
for their actions and, collectively, for the overall magnitude of
the “crime problem.” The crime master narrative portrays their
lawbreaking as the product of their entirely free choices, ones
exercised by persons unencumbered by background and
circumstance. These choices are commonly regarded as having
been willfully and selfishly made, despite the perpetrators’ full
knowledge of their hurtful consequences. As a result, criminal
behavior is seen as a reflection of the inherent “badness” of
those who engage in it.195
To paraphrase Haney, our cultural master story concerning crime offers
individualistic explanations for criminal behavior, chalking bad behavior up to
Bad Seeds, who are, of course, a kind of stock character.
b.

Introduction to Character

“Character is often at the core of legal storytelling . . . .”196 Amsterdam
and Bruner assert that even if they are purportedly animals, aliens, or machines,
a story’s characters must be “human-like . . . capable of willing their own
actions, forming intentions, holding beliefs, having feelings.”197 Within a
narrative, characters may be either flat or round.198 Round characters are
complex and multi-dimensional (like, one hopes, most human beings), while
flat characters are simple and one-dimensional.199 With exceptions for some
192

Craig Haney, On Mitigation as Counter-Narrative: A Case Study of the Hidden Context of
Prison Violence, 77 UMKC L. REV. 911, 913 (2009).
193
Id. at 914.
194
See id.
195
Id. at 914.
196
Meyer, supra note 171, at 261.
197
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 174, at 113 (emphasis omitted).
198
E.g., Philip N. Meyer, Are the Characters in a Death Penalty Brief Like the Characters in
a Movie?, 32 VT. L. REV. 877, 885 (2008).
199
Id. (citing GERALD PRINCE, A DICTIONARY OF NARRATOLOGY 12 (rev. ed. 2003)).
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genres (fables, myths, etc.), the protagonist in a narrative typically is a round
character.200
Just as there are archetypal plots, there are archetypal characters—
kinds of characters about whom we have embedded knowledge—who inhabit
those plots.201 Once we are attuned to the character, we know the plot (and vice
versa) and the character’s role in the plot. Again, our character schemas shape
what we actually see and may obscure other information: we may not, for
example, see that the Jock loves gardening and classical music. These
archetypal or stock characters often are flat characters, but this flatness can
serve the larger needs of the plot.
Obviously there are differences between character construction in
fiction versus litigation. A lawyer’s construction of character must be based in
reality, that is, in facts that can be presented. If, for example, the lawyer intends
to depict her client as gullible, real facts—evidence—must support that
depiction. That being said, lawyers nonetheless are engaged in the process of
character construction. Most human beings are “bundle[s] of contradiction,”202
and in telling a client’s story, lawyers necessarily emphasize certain aspects of
a client’s character, downplay the importance of others, and leave other traits
out entirely (perhaps because the traits simply aren’t relevant or will remove
emphasis from other characteristics).
Professor Philip Meyer has noted a variety of ways in which a
storyteller may construct and depict character. First, a storyteller can depict
character “economically and elegantly through use of selected details,”203 with
a few such details perhaps capturing the essence of a person. What might one
make, for example, of a person depicted as always seeming to have ketchup on
his tie? Second, “character can and does indeed imply conduct, not only
attributing motivation and explanation to what has already happened, but also
foreshadowing what will happen next.”204 For example, in a capital case, jurors
sometimes must predict whether the defendant will be dangerous in the future,
and the picture drawn of the defendant both by the prosecution and the defense
largely will drive this determination; differently put, jurors will predict future
dangerousness based on their assessments of the defendant’s character.

200

Id.
See Edwards, supra note 13, at 890 (“Myth, too, provides a ready stock of characters to
‘people’ [these] plots with champions, children, tricksters, mentors, kings, mothers, demons, and
sages.”); see also Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers, and Merlin: Telling the
Client’s Story Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767 (2006) (analyzing uses of Hero archetype in legal advocacy).
202
ANNE FRANK, THE DIARY OF A YOUNG GIRL: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION 335 (Otto H. Frank
& Mirjam Pressler eds. 1995) (referring to herself as a “bundle of contradiction”).
203
Meyer, supra note 171, at 263.
204
Id. at 264.
201
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Finally—and importantly—characters can develop and change throughout a
narrative.205
c.

Introduction to Other Aspects of Narrative

Although this Article principally is concerned with plot and character,
both theme and setting play major roles in litigation narratives.
Professor Meyer has described theme as the “recurring melody” within
a plot line.206 According to John Gardner, an appropriate theme arises from
within a story;207 that is, there must be a close fit between the story actually told
and the theme of the story. Setting focuses on the where and when of a plot.208
In litigation, opposing lawyers may disagree on the proper setting for a
narrative: should the lens be closely focused on one or two events, or does the
action begin at another time and place?
2.

Metaphor

If we in law are “swimming in a sea of narrative,”209 then metaphor
surely is the salt in the sea. As is true of stories, the images created by
metaphors “unavoidably shape our perceptions and reasoning processes, often
unconsciously.”210 According to cognitive scientists, “metaphor is fundamental
to both thought and expression,”211 so its use in legal analysis and persuasion is
inevitable. Indeed, metaphors allow us to think about and analyze abstract
ideas.212 Five minutes with a freshman poetry anthology makes this clear: hope
is “the thing with feathers,”213 and freedom is “just frosting [o]n somebody
else’s [c]ake.”214
Why should lawyers and legal scholars care about metaphors?
Metaphors for the abstract concepts one encounters in law are important

205

Id. at 263.
Id. at 260.
207
See GARDNER, supra note 172, at 70.
208
Cf. Meyer, supra note 171, at 269–70 (“While creating a sense of place in stories often
does not have the power or significance of ‘character’ in modern storytelling practices,
descriptions of settings and environments are more significant than they may initially appear.”).
209
Edwards, supra note 13, at 884.
210
Berger, supra note 186, at 277.
211
Berger, supra note 12, at 265.
212
See Berger, supra note 186, at 283 (“Metaphor frames issues by allowing us to map
inferences from concrete visual images onto abstract concepts and to fit concepts into
categories.”).
213
Emily Dickinson, Poem # 254, in SIX AMERICAN POETS: AN ANTHOLOGY 79 (Joel Conarroe
ed., Vintage Books 1993).
214
Langston Hughes, Frosting, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF LANGS, supra note 9, at 550.
206
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because they are not only “ways of seeing or highlighting some aspects of a
concept . . . [but] they also are ways of not seeing others.”215 One who
conceives proximate cause as a stream “joined by tributary after tributary”216
and ultimately leading to the ocean sees something different from one who
conceives it as a “chain or . . . a net.”217 In fact, the choice of a particular
metaphor in law often “lends an aura of logical inevitability to the legal
conclusion that follows the categorization.”218
Furthermore, like master stories, certain metaphors possess particular
power by virtue of how deeply embedded they are within a culture.219 The more
deeply embedded certain narratives and metaphors are, the more influential
they will be once activated.220 In fact, under such circumstances, “judgments
are more likely to be based on assumptions derived from categories and
schemas than on evidence of individual characteristics.”221
Because of their great power, narratives and metaphors deeply
embedded within a culture can present immense opportunities and hazards for
advocates. If an advocate can invoke a deeply embedded narrative or metaphor
that advances her client’s position, probably more than half of her work is
done. If, however, the master stories and metaphors initially seem to favor the
client’s opponent, the advocate faces a daunting task. How can she challenge
such narratives and metaphors?
Simply put, she probably can’t challenge them directly,222 but must
reframe the conflict. Invocation of fresh and different metaphors may allow for
rethinking of what was thought to be known, established, and settled. A new
215

Berger, supra note 186, at 278.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
217
Id. Powerful examples abound within and outside law. Consider the difference between the
following metaphors for the body:
“Or do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit?”
1 Corinthians 6:19.
“Death is the bowel movement of the soul evacuating the body by intense
pressure on the spiritual anus.”
JAMES GEARY, THE WORLD IN A PHRASE: A HISTORY OF APHORISMS 186 (2005) (quoting Malcom
de Chazal).
218
Berger, supra note 12, at 265.
219
See Berger, supra note 186, at 279 (“Imaginative maps for understanding become deeply
embedded in our consciousness because we acquire them through our daily experience in the
world.”).
220
Consider, for example, how Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor has influenced the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See id. at 290 (“[T]he
image of a wall has become our common-sense understanding about the relationship between
religion and the government.”).
221
Id. at 301.
216

222

See id. at 303 (“Because embedded narratives represent past stories and events, they cannot
be proven wrong.”).
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narrative can reframe the Trouble: the Trouble may appear to be x, but in fact is
y, and the master story doesn’t “fit” y. In my opinion, one of the best ways to
reframe the conflict is to find other culturally embedded metaphors and
narratives that may better explain the facts of the case than do the narratives
and metaphors that favor your opponent.
B.

The Use of Narrative and Metaphor in Capital Trials

As with movies, capital trials contain multiple narratives. They also
contain competing narratives—the narratives offered by the prosecution and the
counter-narratives offered by the defendant. The outcome of the litigation and
the fate of the defendant depend on whose narrative prevails either as the “true”
narrative or as the “master” narrative (assuming the truth of several of the
narratives).
Capital trials are bifurcated and consist of a guilt-or-innocence phase
and, assuming a guilty verdict in the first phase, a sentencing phase during
which the parties present evidence relevant to the appropriate punishment.
Defense counsel’s obligation to provide constitutionally effective assistance
during the sentencing phase includes the duty to conduct a “thorough
investigation of the defendant’s background”223 and, where appropriate
strategically, to present evidence that mitigates the defendant’s culpability.224
This mitigating evidence reaches beyond the circumstances of the crime
itself.225 Both the 1989 and more recent 2003 American Bar Association
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases repeatedly stress counsel’s duty to investigate and present
relevant mitigating evidence, including evidence concerning a defendant’s
family history and mental impairments.226
For example, in Williams v. Taylor,227 the Supreme Court found a
capital defense lawyer constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate and
present (1) evidence “describing [the defendant’s] nightmarish childhood, . . .
[including evidence] that Williams’ parents had been imprisoned for the
223

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000).
See id. at 393 (noting the defendant had a “constitutionally protected right to provide the
jury with the mitigating evidence that his trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to
offer”).
225
See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (“[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record . . . that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”).
226
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE
OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (Rev. ed. 2003), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/Death_Penalty_Representation/Stan
dards/National/2003Guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf.
227
529 U.S. 362.
224
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criminal neglect of Williams and his siblings, that Williams had been severely
and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had been committed to the custody
of the social services bureau for two years during his parents’ incarceration
(including one stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his parents were
released from prison, had been returned to his parents’ custody”;228 or (2)
evidence “that Williams was ‘borderline mentally retarded’ and did not
advance beyond sixth grade in school.”229
Typical narrative strategies vary by phase of trial. The initial “Trouble”
in a capital case is well-defined: a member of the community has suffered a
violent death, presumably at the hands of another human. The guilt-orinnocence phase of trial often is defined by plot: What actually happened? Even
assuming the Trouble, was the defendant the source of the trouble; that is, did
the defendant kill the victim or did someone else? Or is what appears to be one
kind of Trouble really another? Perhaps the decedent actually committed
suicide or suffered a terrible accident.
Naturally, character plays some role in the guilt-or-innocence phase.
Character may be relevant to issues concerning mens rea or credibility, for
example. An insanity defense may change the narrative battlefield from one
dominated by plot to one dominated by character. But generally the guilt-orinnocence phase of a capital trial is plot-driven.
In contrast, the penalty phase of a trial is, at least from the defendant’s
perspective, driven by character and, to a degree, by setting. Importantly, the
narratives from the guilt-or-innocence phase continue to play a role, because
the jury accepted the prosecution’s narrative during that portion of trial. Often,
of course, the prosecution will contend that the nature of the defendant’s crime
provides sufficient information about the defendant’s character, and many
capital jurors agree that a defendant’s crime itself tends to reveal enough about
character upon which to base the sentencing decision.230 In short, the
prosecution’s narrative strategy frequently focuses on one act—the crime in
question—as revealing the defendant’s “true” character.231
One potential difference between the guilt-or-innocence phase and the
penalty phase from the prosecution’s perspective is the nature of the Trouble.
In the capital trial’s first phase, the fact of the murder is the Trouble. In the
penalty phase, the fact of the guilty defendant is (at least potentially and to the
prosecution) the Trouble: we have someone in our midst who has disrupted our
tranquility through killing one of our own, so what action or redress is
appropriate?
228

Id. at 395.
Id. at 396.
230
See Bowers et al., supra note 45, at 199 (noting percentage of jurors with an opinion
regarding sentence at the end of the guilt-or-innocence phase of the trial).
231
Of course, if the defendant committed crimes in the past, the prosecution also may point to
those as revelatory regarding character.
229
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As many have pointed out, the job of defense counsel is to create an
effective counter-narrative to the prosecution’s narrative:
One important limit to defense creative styles and methods in
these cases is surely that “the state bats first, creating an instant
narrative when someone is accused of murder. Words get
thrown about and stick: brutal, vicious, violent,
dangerous.” . . . From defense counsel’s standpoint, the virtue
of effective storytelling is “to turn the dominant narrative—the
one created by the state that stresses the crime and its
brutality—upside down by calling for a reversal of traditional
courtroom storytelling.” . . . [I]n a well-tried capital case, there
is a stark juxtaposition that now regularly occurs in capital
penalty trials: a conventional “crime master narrative” . . . is
contrasted with a “mitigation counter-narrative” that
incorporates a more comprehensive and empirically welldocumented understanding of a capital defendant’s life.232
Professor Haney posits that the prosecution’s most powerful narrative is our
societal crime master narrative that understands criminal behavior “as an
individual-level phenomenon that lacks an explanatory social context.”233 In
short, crime—including violent crime—is a product of the bad character of the
criminal.
To counter the prosecution’s narrative, defense lawyers broaden the
lens beyond the defendant’s criminal act. The setting for the defense narrative
changes dramatically, perhaps beginning years before the defendant’s birth and
spanning any number of places—schools, mental hospitals, the home, perhaps
even battlefields in distant lands. Finally (and almost invariably), defense
lawyers will challenge the prosecution’s characterization of the defendant as a
stock character—the violent criminal, the monster, the brute—with information
showing the defendant to be multi-dimensional, flawed but ultimately capable
of redemption. For example, a mitigation narrative may touch upon the
defendant’s attempts to overcome a history of severe abuse, service in the
military and subsequent PTSD, family and personal history of severe mental

232

Michael N. Burt, The Importance of Storytelling at All Stages of a Capital Case, 77 UMKC
L. REV. 877, 879 (2009) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Haney, supra note 192, at 913 (“An
especially persuasive and credible counter-narrative that appears to better account for the facts at
hand may be used to debunk, neutralize, or even supplant the master narrative with which it is
competing.”) (citation omitted); Sean O’Brien, Death Penalty Stories: Lessons in Life-Saving, 77
UMKC L. REV. 831, 835 (2009) (“The use of sound narrative technique, both in the investigation
and presentation of the defense case, is now a standard practice for capital defense work.”); cf.
Mark E. Olive, Narrative Works, 77 UMKC L. REV. 989, 989 (2009) (describing the job of
capital post-conviction counsel as “changing what the case is about” through more complete and
more accurate narratives).
233
Haney, supra note 192, at 914.
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illness, gentleness as a husband, father, brother, or son, his low intelligence and
domination by a more sophisticated defendant, etc. As one lawyer explained to
Austin Sarat: “Well-done biography is what wins hearts and minds.”234
Of course, the overarching goal of creating this broader narrative lens
is to (re)humanize the defendant to the jurors. The equation commonly (if not
directly) recognized by defense lawyers is that empathy equals life: “To
persuade decision-makers against the death penalty, the story [counternarrative] must reveal the client’s intrinsic humanity.”235 The basis for defense
lawyers’ faith in this equation is their “widely held belief that jurors and judges
will only condemn those whom they see as fundamentally ‘other,’ as inhuman,
and as outside the reach of . . . compassionate beings.”236
Although there certainly is some support for lawyers’ assumptions that
traditional mitigation testimony is associated with greater juror empathy and
with life sentences,237 all too often defense lawyers accept uncritically the
assumption that a generous helping of traditional mitigation testimony—
evidence of child abuse and neglect, family “pathology” and mental illness, and
poverty, for example—will allow jurors to empathize with capital defendants.
But what if, in the case of black defendants, traditional mitigation testimony—
at least if not very carefully presented—risks creating a greater chasm between
the defendant and the mostly white jurors than already exists? What if, in other
words, jurors hear traditional mitigation narratives differently when the
narrative concerns a black defendant? Could a compelling narrative for a white
defendant become a stock script when applied to a black defendant? There is
some reason to fear that is exactly the case.

234

Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
353, 369 (1996).
235
O’Brien, supra note 232, at 847 (describing common thread in defense lawyers’ theories
about the role of storytelling in capital litigation).
236
Sarat, supra note 234, at 370–71 (citation omitted).
237
See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 105, at 197 (explaining that the results of mock experiment
showed “among those who voted for life, the testimony about the defendant’s history of child
abuse and the psychiatric problems he faced as a result of his upbringing was the most
compelling evidence in favor of life”); see also id. at 190 (“Because creating empathy for the
defendant in the penalty phase through a mitigation narrative is key to overcoming a death
verdict, the willingness and/or ability of jurors to empathize with the defendant will influence
outcome . . . . [A]mong the most plausible explanations for the consistent finding in archival
analyses that killers of Whites are more likely to receive death sentences than killers of Blacks is
that White jurors, who end up being the majority in most capital juries, feel more empathy for
White victims.”).
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Criticism of the Traditional Mitigation Counter-Narrative When
Applied to Black and Other Minority Defendants

Lawyers and researchers know that white jurors tend to empathize less
with black defendants than with white defendants, even when exposed to the
same mitigation narrative.238 The experiments performed by Professors Lynch
and Haney239 revealed that white participants “were reluctant to attach much
significance at all to mitigating circumstances when they were offered on
behalf of an African American defendant. . . . [and] appeared less able or
willing to empathize with or enter the world of African-American
defendants.”240
There appear to be two major criticisms of the use of traditional
mitigation discourse—that is, a mitigation strategy focusing on the defendant’s
tragic history of abuse, neglect, mental illness, and family dysfunction or
trauma—in capital cases involving black defendants. First, some critics argue
that when it comes to black defendants, traditional mitigation narratives are
underinclusive and, therefore, less effective than they could be.241 According to
these critics, defense lawyers should educate jurors about the long-term effects
America’s racist history has had upon the lives of black families and, more
specifically, upon black capital defendants.242
The second major criticism is related to the first but is more radical. It
posits that not only does traditional mitigation discourse do little to bridge the
empathy gap between white jurors and black defendants, but it may, in fact,
create a greater chasm than existed before.243 In other words, a defense lawyer’s
conscientious but uncritical use of a traditional mitigation narrative may
augment rather than counter the prosecution’s sentencing phase narrative,
thereby increasing the likelihood of a death sentence for the black defendant.
Craig Haney is a major proponent of the position that traditional
mitigation narratives are underinclusive when one considers black capital
defendants. Although acknowledging that “[t]errible, traumatizing, and
criminogenic social histories are not unique to minority capital defendants,”244
Professor Haney posits that “the life histories of African-American defendants

238

See id. at 194–95.
See supra notes 142–149 and accompanying text.
240
Haney, supra note 16, at 1584–85.
241
See, e.g., id.
242
Id. at 1558 (arguing that a large number of black defendants “continue to be sentenced to
death in the United States because of the failure to collect and properly analyze this structural
mitigation [information about the effects of racism on African-American defendants] and to
present it effectively to sentencing juries”); see also id. at 1586–88 (describing how defense
lawyers might go about presenting evidence of biographical racism as structural mitigation).
243
See Lane, supra note 18.
244
Haney, supra note 16, at 1562.
239
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tend to be replete with such risk factors, in ways that are distinctive, and
distinctly mitigating.”245 Like many—perhaps most—capital defendants of any
race, African-American capital defendants frequently were exposed during
childhood to criminogenic influences like poverty, unsafe and crime-ridden
neighborhoods, and abusive parenting.246 Additionally, however, AfricanAmerican children are disproportionately “shaped and redirected by harsh
forms of direct state intervention in ways that increase the likelihood that they
will be placed in juvenile justice institutions and, at later ages, incarcerated by
the adult criminal justice system.”247 For example, African-American children
are more likely to become wards of the child welfare system and are, therefore,
more likely to be harmed by the “serious inadequacies that plague the child
welfare system.”248 They are “singled out disproportionately for school
discipline”249 and are far more likely to be assigned to special education classes
or labeled emotionally disturbed.250 They also are disproportionately
represented in the juvenile justice system; for example, “African-American
children with no prior admissions to the juvenile justice system were six times
more likely to be incarcerated in a public facility than white children with the
same background who were charged with the same offense,” and the average
sentence of juvenile justice incarceration was longer.251 (As Professor Haney
points out, juvenile justice institutions are “plagued by criminogenic
conditions.”252)
Pointing to these and other factors, he concludes that persons of color
frequently are exposed “to experiences—in their nature, severity, duration, and
amount—that no one else in this society has and that may leave an indelible
mark.”253 Professor Haney uses the term “biographical racism” to describe the
sum total of these various influences.254 After pointing out the features of
biographical racism, he argues such racism is a form of “structural

245

Id. at 1563.
Id. at 1563–64.
247
Id. at 1565.
248
Id.
249
Id. at 1566.
250
Id. at 1567.
251
Id. at 1569–70.
252
Id. at 1571.
253
Id. at 1576.
254
See id. at 1562 (“As these experiences accumulate over the life span, they represent a form
of biographical racism, a racism that exercises such profound influence over the life course and
social histories of those exposed to it that it literally structures their biographies.”).
246
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mitigation”255 about which capital jurors should be educated during the
sentencing phase of capital trials.256
My principal criticism of Professor Haney’s suggestion is one he would
probably share. Namely, it’s all well and good to discuss the need to educate
jurors about biographical racism as a form of structural mitigation, but actually
doing so effectively isn’t easy at all. He notes the particular “empathic divide”
that exists between white jurors and black capital defendants, admitting that his
own research suggests that “white jurors . . . are either less able or less willing
to empathize and come to terms with, in a mitigating way, the significance of
key background factors in the lives of African-American defendants in making
assessments of blameworthiness and moral culpability.”257 He suggests defense
counsel must provide jurors not only with data about biographical racism, but
also must somehow present information in such a way that allows jurors to feel
what discrimination is like.258 Unfortunately—and apparently he would admit
this—he fails to provide specific recommendations for how to accomplish this.
Attorney Alycee Lane is the major proponent of the more radical
position that traditional mitigation discourse may increase the empathic divide
that already exists between white jurors and black capital defendants.
According to Lane, traditional mitigation narratives about defendants’
dysfunctional family lives may reinforce jurors’ racial prejudices, undermine
defense attempts to create juror empathy for capital defendants who happen to
be black, and ultimately increase the likelihood of death sentences against such
defendants.259 Lane’s particular focus concerns mitigation narratives about the
family. As any capital defense lawyer knows, major portions of case
investigation and sentencing phase testimony focus on the defendant’s family
life.260 Capital defense lawyers routinely present evidence regarding the
impoverished, abusive, and chaotic families whence their clients came, hoping
jurors will find the client less culpable given the client’s childhood
deprivations.
Lane considers this strategy naïve in its failure to take into account the
influence of the defendant’s race upon the jurors’ expectations of “typical”
family life. Specifically, she notes that “[b]ecause it does not even begin to
address the intersection of race and family, mitigation discourse presents to

255
See id. at 1577 (defining “structural mitigation” as “mitigation that is structured into the
lives of African-American defendants by the various forms of life-altering racism that remain in
American society”).
256
See id. at 1558 (arguing that “so many African-American defendants continue to be
sentenced to death in the United States because of the failure to collect and properly analyze this
structural mitigation and to present it effectively to sentencing juries”).
257
Id. at 1586.
258
Id. at 1587.
259
260

See Lane, supra note 18.
See supra notes 223–229 and accompanying text.
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jurors the defendant’s ‘dysfunctional family’ as if it will do the same kind of
work for all defendants, regardless of race.”261 Lane implies that traditional
mitigating evidence about a defendant’s family life may work well enough for
many white defendants, for whom jurors may harbor implicit expectations of a
“normal” (i.e., nuclear) family and a nurturing family life, the absence of which
strongly affected the defendant’s development. However, white jurors’ schemas
for the “black family” may include so-called pathology as a defining feature:
these jurors may see the “black family” as the “household of the single black
mother, in which unkempt and out-of-control children—all with different,
perhaps unknown fathers—abound.”262 If a black capital defendant’s family life
is consistent with this schema, that actually may be a cause for less juror
empathy rather than more:
But because of the power and resilience of racist stereotypes
about the black family, the “dysfunctional family” might in
fact do more harm than good for black defendants facing the
death penalty. Specifically, it may frame black defendants as
typical, predictable, and always already known factors because
they are what black families inevitably produce. It may, in
other words, underscore that black capital defendants are
anything but unique and individual, something jurors are
already predisposed to believe. . . .
Far from undermining . . . cultural distancing, then, the
dysfunctional family construct most likely rationalizes it, and
may function as part of white jurors’ “understanding” of “that
set of people,” i.e., “the black group.” Consequently, it may
also serve as a means to view the defendant not as a unique
individual, but as part of an undifferentiated, “inferior
‘other.’”263
Lane’s point, which I believe is accurate, can be expressed using the
language either of cognitive psychology or of Amsterdam and Bruner’s plot
formulations. Consider first cognitive science. Recall that priming a subject
with one stereotype of a group can activate other stereotypes of that group: for
example, violent rap music that primes the stereotype that blacks are aggressive
and violent also activates other stereotypes concerning blacks, such as
stereotypes concerning intelligence and ability.264 If white Americans hold
implicit biases about “the black family”—and there is every reason to believe

261

Lane, supra note 18, at 188.
Id. at 192. In describing this schema for the black family, Lane attributes the schema in
large part to the long shadow cast by the Moynihan Report of the 1960s. Id.
263
Id. at 188.
264
See Levinson, supra note 14, at 632 (describing experiment).
262
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that they do265—then mitigating information consistent with these biases may
activate or strengthen other implicit racial biases that may hurt the defendant.
Such implicit biases may include stereotypes concerning black criminality,
aggression, and violence. Here, this is particularly likely to be the case given
the strong cultural association (created in part by the Moynihan Report)
between the single black mother and black male criminality.266 In other words,
the schema-consistent mitigating evidence about the defendant’s family life
may simply activate other racial schemas that are, in fact, aggravating.
Viewed in plot terms, the influence of racial stereotypes is equally
apparent. If the general schema for “family” in American culture continues to
be a schema in which two parents—a male and female—though imperfect,
generally are nurturing, and in which basic material needs are met, then a
defendant’s birth into an abusive and impoverished family constitutes a kind of
trouble meriting the jury’s attention. If, on the other hand, there is a schema
sub-category for “black families” that includes poverty, abuse, neglect, and
other pathology as expectations, then the defendant’s birth into such an
environment isn’t trouble at all; rather, it’s just another stock script peopled by
stock characters and calling for a stock response—here, death.
IV. THE USE OF NARRATIVE AND METAPHOR TO CHALLENGE OTHER
EMBEDDED NARRATIVES AND TO CHALLENGE RACIAL SCHEMAS: TWO CASE
STUDIES
Part II demonstrated that jurors’ implicit biases likely influence how
they perceive and interpret evidence concerning black defendants, and,
consequently, also influence their sentencing decisions. After providing a
general overview concerning narrative and its usual use in capital trials, Part III
noted that even defense narratives in capital trials actually may reinforce jurors’
implicit racial schemas. This section brings Parts II and III together by
addressing how lawyers might use narrative and metaphor to neutralize or
minimize jurors’ implicit biases.
If the recommendations of Professors Blasi and Kang267 about
minimizing implicit bias are correct, then defense narratives probably should
(a) determine other schemas (beyond the racial or ethnic ones) that apply to a
defendant, and work to emphasize those, thereby inhibiting the activation of a
racial schema; (b) incorporate (to the extent the facts allow it) themes based on

265
See, e.g., Lane, supra note 18, at 192–96 (discussing media and other stereotypes of the
black family and associations of these stereotypes with societal violence).
266
See id. at 193 (noting that Moynihan “seamlessly connected the black family, through the
figure of the single black mother/matriarch, with the issue of black male criminality. Specifically,
Moynihan makes single black mothers the source of the ‘crime, violence, unrest,’ and ‘disorder’
that black men visit upon black communities.”).
267
See supra Part II.F.
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fairness and equality, thereby priming jurors not to act in discriminatory ways;
and (c) either expose the jurors to counter-stereotypical exemplars or, in the
alternative, fit the defendant into a subtype that exempts him from the negative
characteristics associated with the larger group. The research on narrative and
metaphor suggests that the use of new metaphors and narratives—particularly
those that already are deeply embedded within a culture—may help shift jurors’
perspective and may activate different schemas, thereby inhibiting the
activation of negative racial or ethnic schemas.
This section analyzes narratives in two capital cases, looking at the
opening and closing arguments in those cases. As to each case, this section will
identify some of the schemas that the defense attorney must challenge and will
analyze how the attorney’s use of narrative and metaphor does or does not
challenge/inhibit the negative racial or ethnic schemas that may otherwise
influence the jurors in sentencing.
A.

Alan Quinones268

This section begins with a capital case involving a Latino defendant,
Alan Quinones.269 Given this Article’s focus on the use of narrative to
challenge implicit biases concerning black defendants, initially I hesitated to
discuss this case. However, defense counsel’s narrative strategies during
opening and closing are precisely those I believe should be used to combat
jurors’ implicit biases about race. Among other things, counsel invoked
competing role schemas, presented Mr. Quinones as a counter-stereotypical
exemplar, and employed metaphor to prime jurors’ belief in the dignity of
every human being. To be sure, counsel was trying to challenge implicit biases
concerning ethnicity and role—the “Latino drug trafficker”270—rather than
implicit biases about black males. Nevertheless, counsel’s effectiveness in
countering various stereotypes was sufficiently impressive that I concluded that
268

Capital defense lawyer Michael Burt reproduced portions of this opening statement in his
article in UMKC’s symposium on Death Penalty Stories. See Michael N. Burt, The Importance of
Storytelling at All Stages of a Capital Case, 77 UMKC L. REV. 877, 897–900 (2009). We use
many of the same passages, but I have used other passages as well (taken both from the opening
and closing statements). Like me, Mr. Burt used the opening statement to provide an example of
effective storytelling, concluding that an “effective opening statement in the sentencing phase of
a capital trial ‘must . . . develop the nature and character of the people involved.’” Id. at 900
(citing Gerald R. Powell, Opening Statements: The Art of Storytelling, 31 STETSON L. REV. 89
(2001)). I wholly agree with this statement but am examining the opening statement in a slightly
different light. I am particularly concerned with how the opening statement’s narrative and
metaphors challenge culturally embedded images and master stories with other culturally
embedded images and master stories; that is, I examine how the opening statement’s narrative
may inhibit activation of schemas involving Latinos and drug traffickers.
269
United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289 (2d Cir. 2007).
270

Psychological studies suggest widespread implicit bias against Latinos. See Kang, supra
note 36, at 1512 (citing study).
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a discussion of his techniques and narrative choices should be fruitful to
someone seeking to counter implicit racial biases.
What follows is an examination of defense counsel’s opening and
closing statements during the penalty phase of the capital trial of Mr. Quinones.
In considering these statements, one should be aware of the evidence to which
the jury already had been exposed. A short summary of such evidence follows.
At the guilt-or-innocence phase of trial, the jury had convicted
Quinones of racketeering, drug trafficking, and the murder of a confidential
informant in relation to a continuing drug enterprise.271 The guilt-or-innocence
phase evidence indicated that Quinones was a relatively large scale dealer of
cocaine and heroin, distributing drugs obtained from Florida and New York in
Pennsylvania.272 The United States also introduced evidence that, upon learning
one of his associates had informed upon him and set him up for arrest,
Quinones spent three months looking for the man and threatening to “put his
head in a box.”273 Quinones eventually located the informant, whom the police
later found hog-tied and burned beyond recognition; the medical examiner’s
reports suggested the informant had died of asphyxiation.274 There was
evidence that Quinones bragged about the murder and claimed to relish the
chance to kill another informant.275
As should be apparent, the defendant entered the sentencing phase of
trial burdened by several deeply embedded (not to mention deeply negative)
narratives and images. Foremost among these are the culture’s master stories
about drug violence and character schemas for drug dealers. According to our
culture’s deeply embedded (in my view) character schemas, drug dealers or
traffickers are ruthless, violent, avaricious, and—importantly here—often
Latino underworld parasites who prey on economically depressed communities
and kill brutally and without compunction. I suspect that for most who serve on
federal juries, a drug trafficker is almost wholly Other, and capital jurors tend
to kill those whom they view as other—especially when those others do, in
fact, appear to be quite violent. In countering the prosecution’s narrative, with
its deeply embedded character schemas, attorney Kevin McNally employed a
number of devices:

271

Quinones, 511 F.3d 289. The facts I provide about the guilt-or-innocence phase of the trial
are taken directly from the Second Circuit’s opinion. Obviously certain questions of facts were
disputed at trial, and, just as obviously, the facts from the court’s opinion necessarily are
incomplete. That said, the jury at least heard—and, to a degree, accepted—a more elaborate
version of the facts recounted in the Second Circuit’s opinion.
272
Id. at 292.
273
Id. at 293.
274
275

Id. at 294.
Id.
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•

Use of an initial metaphor both to challenge the
“Latino drug trafficker” schema and to alter the setting
for the narrative;

•

Presentation of Quinones as a counter-stereotypical
exemplar among drug traffickers, thereby exempting
him (to a degree) from the “Latino drug trafficker”
schema;

•

Invocation of competing role schemas (not to mention
a competing master story) that both countered the
“Latino drug trafficker” schema and better explained
all of Quinones’s behavior;

•

Brief invocation, during the closing argument, of a
cultural master narrative concerning the immigrant
story and the American Dream that placed Quinones
squarely within a broad American tradition.

351

Each of these devices helped to neutralize and, at times, to upend the negative
schemas suggested by many of the facts of the crime and by the prosecution’s
narrative.
1.

The Opening Metaphor

Defense lawyer Kevin McNally began his penalty phase opening
statement with a simple metaphor: “36 years ago a child of God was born, and I
say that because all children are children of God.”276 Although McNally’s
metaphor may appear trite at first blush,277 the metaphor is deeply embedded
within American culture and quickly and effectively furthers at least three aims
essential to an effective defense.
First, recall that implicit stereotypes can be less powerful when persons
have been primed with ideals of fairness and nondiscrimination.278 Here, the
“child of God” metaphor implicitly primes within jurors one of the central
values animating Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: namely, respect for the
dignity of the individual—that is, the idea that every individual in society is a
person of worth and that, therefore, any punishment must be based on
individual facts and circumstances, not generalities. By selecting an image most
jurors would accept, McNally is implicitly reminding them of their own
commitments not to be reductive when determining character—someone is

276

Transcript of Record at 2942, Quinones, 511 F.3d 289 (No. 00-761) [hereinafter Quinones
Transcript] (emphasis added).
277
Note, however, that it appears trite in part because it is so well-accepted; even many
atheists would embrace the general sentiment the metaphor is intended to express.
278
See supra notes 158–160 and accompanying text.
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never just a drug trafficker or a member of a particular ethnic group, so the jury
should listen carefully to all of the evidence about who Quinones is. In
narrative terms, this metaphor establishes Quinones as a round character rather
than the flat character implied by the “Latino drug trafficker” character schema:
to be a child of God is to be complex, worthy of respect and sustained and
serious consideration.
Second, recall that capital jurors are less likely to impose death
sentences upon those for whom they feel empathy, but that otherness can equal
death.279 Here, the “child of God” metaphor not only primes jurors to treat
Quinones as an individual, but also challenges the characterization of Quinones
as Other. A “Latino drug trafficker” may be Other, but we are all “children of
God.” Rather than the law-abiding jurors existing within one circle and the
defendant drug trafficker within a foreign, frightening, and far away circle, the
jurors and Quinones are joined within one circle from the beginning of the
opening statement. This image thus not only challenges the reductive drug
trafficker schema but opens the door to empathy.
Third, the “child of God” image subtly alters the setting in which the
narrative takes place. While the guilt-or-innocence narrative may have been set
only around the time of the crime itself, the sentencing narrative begins much
earlier and concerns issues far broader than merely the crime itself. In short, the
very beginning of defense counsel’s opening statement signals to audience
members that they’re about to hear a new story, one with a round character (the
child of God, with his individual traits) rather than the flat, stereotypical “drug
trafficker” of the guilt-or-innocence phase, and one that begins long before the
crime of which Quinones was convicted.
2.

The Defendant as Counter-Stereotypical Exemplar

Defense counsel’s work to neutralize the “Latino drug trafficker”
schema hardly stopped at his opening metaphor. Counsel also undermined the
negative character schema by acknowledging that although Quinones had, in
fact, trafficked in drugs, he was an extremely atypical drug dealer—that is, a
counter-stereotypical exemplar or, at the least, a subtype. (Recall that
presentation of counter-stereotypical exemplars can reduce or inhibit activation
of implicit biases.280)
Throughout the opening and closing statements of the sentencing phase
of trial, McNally called attention to facts showing Quinones’s atypicality as a
drug trafficker. At times McNally was explicit: “[t]his is not a common drug
dealer. You won’t find evidence of big cars and mansions and flashy jewelry

279

See supra notes 234–237 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 148–149 and
accompanying text (describing jurors’ frequent lack of empathy for black defendants and the
resulting effect on sentencing decisions).
280
See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text.
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and being self-centered and being that kind of stuff.”281 During closing,
McNally pointed out that rather than spend his money on mansions and
jewelry, Quinones spent it as a “secret Santa” for orphans in his
neighborhood,282 spent it on bribes to secure housing for his mentally ill
mother,283 and spent it helping his sister “dry out” and establish a new life for
herself.284
On other occasions, McNally’s presentation of Quinones as a counterstereotypical exemplar is less explicit. Rather than expressly invoking the
common stereotypes concerning drug traffickers, McNally simply points to
facts that are inconsistent with such stereotypes. For example, he notes that
Quinones “treats women with incredible respect. . . . [He has] female friends
that he listens to and cares about . . . . He has not had sexual relationships with
these women. These are women who are his friends.”285 Indeed, Quinones
“never raised a hand to a woman.”286 He helped his nieces and nephews with
their homework.287 Although none of these details change the actual fact
Quinones has trafficked in cocaine and heroin, they nonetheless distance him
from the common stereotype of the drug trafficker as avaricious, materialistic,
and violent toward women.
3.

Employment of Competing Role Schemas and Use of
Archetypal Characters

McNally most strongly counters the “Latino drug trafficker” schema
and the implicit associations accompanying it through his use of a competing
role schema. Recall that there are many schemas that may “fit” any particular
person and that the activation of one schema may inhibit the activation of other,
inconsistent schemas (for example, a female engineer may be perceived as
good at math despite a schema for women as mathematically inept).288 Recall,
as well, a related point: schemas for archetypal characters are quite powerful,

281
Quinones Transcript, supra note 276, at 2957; see also id. at 3953 (“The money may have
been from illegal activities, but he could have bought a mansion, or he could have bought
expensive jewelry, or he could have lived like your ordinary drug dealer. But that’s not who he
is.”).
282
Id. at 3955; see also id. at 2961 (“He did a secret Santa every year, which is where he
would go and read the letters that children would write, and he would pick the ones which the
child wanted something not for themselves but for their family, and he would give them those
presents.”).
283
Id. at 3953.
284
Id. at 3950, 3953.
285
Id. at 2955.
286
Id.
287
288

Id. at 3954.
See supra notes 152–153 and accompanying text.
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and once such schemas are activated, listeners tend to interpret additional
information in ways that are consistent with the schema and that validate their
expectations for the archetypal character.289
Rather than leave the jury to accept the “Latino drug trafficker”
stereotype of Quinones, McNally invokes several character archetypes that cast
Quinones in a positive light while acknowledging and explaining his illegal
behavior. At various times during the opening and closing statements of the
sentencing phase, McNally depicts Quinones as Father/Protector and as SelfSacrificing First Generation Immigrant.
a.

Father/Protector

The depiction of Quinones as a protective father figure initially is
buried in McNally’s narrative concerning Quinones’s life as an abused and
vulnerable child.290 The early portion of the opening statement during
sentencing recounts in detail Quinones’s horrific and deprived childhood:

289

•

As a child, Quinones knew hunger: a social worker
documented that at one point, the food for the
household of seven consisted of some rice and a can of
peas.291 “Mayonnaise sandwiches were a meal.”292

•

He was exposed repeatedly to domestic violence: on
one occasion, Quinones and his brother were afraid to
come home for three days because they feared their
mother “was lying there dead” after a brutal beating
administered by their father;293 on another occasion, he
witnessed his father “sexually abusing his half sister
Diana.”294

•

Quinones himself suffered violence at the hands of
family members; for example, he once tried to stop his
father from stabbing his mother, and his father “lift[ed]

See supra notes 184–193, 201 and accompanying text.
One might argue that McNally creates a rescue narrative as well, but discussion of that
narrative is beyond the scope of this Article.
291
Quinones Transcript, supra note 276, at 2944.
292
Id. at 2945.
293
Id. at 2948; see also id. at 2946 (“The boy first remembers his father cornering his mother
when he was three years old.”); id. at 2947 (noting that “the father’s attacks on the mother
increased, becoming more and more violent”).
294
Id. at 2949.
290
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him up by the neck up against the wall and choke[d]
him.”295
•

Quinones grew up in violent, drug-infested
communities: he and his siblings “remembered the
gunfire [in their neighborhood] and diving under the
table or under the bed for protection.”296 On another
occasion, the child Quinones saw a gang beat a man
until blood ran from the man’s mouth.297

•

Quinones and his siblings enjoyed practically no
security or nurturance; by age twelve, Quinones had
lived in between ten and twenty different foster homes,
shelters, and welfare hotels.298 Moreover, his mother
suffered from both psychiatric illness and various drug
addictions, his father abused drugs, and the family
lacked the help of any extended family members.299
The family was in such desperate straits that the
human beings—the children of God—in the family
were not valued even in ways most people take for
granted:

The family did not celebrate holidays or birthdays, certainly not in the later
years. There were no turkeys cooked on Thanksgiving. The child never had a
birthday party. He never had a birthday cake. And, as he would put it years
later to a psychologist, not even a cupcake with a candle.300
To be sure, even standing alone, the description of Quinones’s tragic
childhood is powerful: what “child of God” deserves the childhood Quinones
got? Nonetheless, this form of mitigation standing alone carries risks. Most
capital defendants have suffered horrific childhoods, and, as demonstrated
above in Part III, such evidence may, at times, reinforce certain negative
schemas: here, the idea that, yes, many drug dealers come from bad
backgrounds, so this man is just like the others and deserves more or less the
same thing—a bad end. However, McNally uses these horrible facts as a setting
for the introduction of a deeply embedded character archetype—
Father/Protector—that better (and more sympathetically) explains Quinones’s
illegal behavior.

295
296
297
298
299
300

Id.
Id. at 2946.
Id.
Id. at 2944.
Id.
Id. at 2947.
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Even relatively early in the narrative of Quinones’ life as depicted in
the opening statement, Quinones begins to function as a protector. While
describing the terrible deprivation and abuse suffered by Quinones and his
siblings as children, McNally points out Quinones’ attempts to protect others:
“[H]e would hide little pieces of bread and then later share them with his
brothers and sisters when there wasn’t any food.”301 Later, but still during
childhood, Quinones got a job at a grocery store and “[w]hen he earned money,
he would run home and give it to his mother to help support the family.”302
Indeed, McNally depicts Quinones’s entry as a teen into the drug trade as an
attempt by an uneducated, traumatized, and culturally deprived young man to
lift his family from its desperate poverty.303
The image of Quinones as a protector and father figure grows stronger
throughout the narrative. In fact, immediately after recounting Quinones’s
transition from boyhood to manhood,304 McNally focuses on Quinones’s
paternal qualities. Specifically, Quinones supplies to others not only material
goods and physical security, but also the nurturance he and his siblings were
denied. He supports his parents and siblings,305 but more importantly, he
nurtures the “next generation.”306 Although he never had as much as a cupcake
with a candle on it, for his own child and at least twenty other children307 he
“remember[ed] birthdays, [gave] Christmas gifts, [took] them out to eat and
[talked] to them about the importance of staying in school and staying off the
streets . . . [and] about relationship problems.”308 A niece he helped was
attending college at the time of the trial.309 As defense counsel summarizes it,
“the evidence will be that he tried to create a family.”310
Introduction of the Father/Protector schema is especially important.
First, his growing up to be a nurturing parent is remarkable given his

301

Id.
Id.
303
Id. at 2952–53 (“Being without food and decent clothes, a safe place to sleep for so long,
he just decided that he was going to go out and support not only himself but as many of his
family as he possibly could. . . . [B]eing a kid with a sixth grade education and no skills, his
options [for earning money] aren’t really very many. I mean, I guess he could get a gun and go
rob people, which he didn’t, or he could sell drugs, which he did.”).
304
Id. at 2954 (“Over the years, this man, now a boy, grew to be a man.”).
305
Id.
306
Id.
307
Id.
308
Id. at 2957.
309
Id. at 2955.
310
Id. McNally also points out that Quinones’s paternal protectiveness and generosity
extended beyond his biological family. For example, upon learning of orphans in his
neighborhood, Quinones “decided that they [had] to have school clothes and school supplies.” Id.
at 2958.
302
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background; that he grows up to treat his children well suggests his intrinsic
goodness. Second, the Father/Protector schema puts his unlawful behavior into
context: fathers and protectors use whatever means they have to provide for and
protect their families, and, given Quinones’s childhood, his perceived (and
actual) options were quite limited. The depiction in the narrative of Quinones
as a protective father figure “redeems” much of his unlawful activity: although
he did many bad things, he did them in service of ultimately admirable ends. In
short, many of his actions have been bad, but he himself is not.
b.

Self-Sacrificing First Generation Immigrant

At the beginning of his closing argument during the penalty phase,
McNally briefly invokes another deeply embedded cultural image—that of the
first generation immigrant:
To impose a death sentence on this first-generation immigrant
who grew up in the killing fields of the Bronx, one witness
[who] . . . talked about it [said it] reminded him of Berlin at the
end of World War II. . . .
. . . Would imposing a death sentence on this first-generation
immigrant, who grew up the way he grew up and who
struggled to lift up his family and in the end sacrificed himself
to do that, would that be the moral decision that we want to
make here?
Look at the second generation. . . . Look at these children here
who have been lifted up . . . would that be a moral decision?311
Like the Father/Protector image, this image—not to mention the master
story that accompanies it—challenges the “Latino drug trafficker” schema.
First, the “first generation immigrant” characterization undermines the notion
that Latino immigrants are somehow foreign and not legitimately American: to
be a first generation immigrant is to be a familiar character in a uniquely
American narrative. Second, given the considerable evidence of Quinones’s
generous, nurturing behavior, the cultural narrative about first generation
immigrants better explains his behavior—even his criminal behavior—than
does the cultural narrative about drug traffickers. The cultural master story
about first generation immigrants is that they sacrifice themselves for the sake
of later generations. Here, Quinones’s entry into the drug business and, perhaps
more importantly, his return to it after an attempt at a low-paying “legitimate”
job are depicted as acts of self-sacrifice necessary for saving, protecting, and
creating opportunities for his immediate family and for the next generation:

311

Id. at 3935–36 (emphasis added).
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This is the choice he had when he came out of prison [the
choice whether to have a lawful, low-paying job or the choice
to continue in the drug business]. . . .
His mom was essentially homeless. Diana is in prison, Anibal
is in prison. Afortunada needed help. [referring to siblings and
other close relatives]
He thought his nieces and nephews were at risk. Lily with her
seven children. . . . He’s working at Kutztown Foundry [a
“legitimate” job], and he’s working at other places in
Pennsylvania, and he worked hard. He was trying to lift his
family up, but he couldn’t do it.
He couldn’t do what he wanted to do.
And perhaps he made an unconscious decision to risk his own
life. He never imagined it would result ultimately in the death
of Edwin Santiago, Jr. He may have thought it would result in
his own death. But he did it for others, not because he wasn’t
happy eating red beans and rice. He did it for others. It makes a
difference. This is a choice that he had. He could cut them
loose or he could not.
He frankly was incapable of cutting
psychologically because of who he is.312

them

loose

Finally, note the close connection between pretrial investigation and
the ability to neutralize jurors’ implicit biases. Had defense counsel’s
investigation been less thorough, he may not have been able to identify
competing role schemas or ways in which the defendant was a counterstereotypical exemplar. Moreover, had McNally been less sensitive to the
jurors’ likely preconceptions (or implicit biases) about “Latino drug
traffickers,” his narrative strategies certainly would have been less effective.
Ultimately, the jury determined death was not the appropriate punishment for
Alan Quinones. Apparently counsel’s strategies worked.
B.

Christopher Williams

This section concludes with a short analysis of the opening and closing
arguments in a capital case in South Carolina. Unlike Alan Quinones,
Christopher Williams was sentenced to death by a capital jury.313 The
defendant, Christopher Williams, was black, and the victim, Mandy

312
313

Id. at 3952–53.
State v. Williams, 690 S.E.2d 62 (S.C. 2010).
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Williams,314 was white. They were co-workers at a local grocery store in a
medium-sized Southern city, and they had dated briefly.315 Mr. Williams shot
Ms. Williams to death during a hostage standoff at the grocery store, and the
State of South Carolina sought the death penalty.316 The major mitigating
evidence during sentencing concerned Mr. Williams’s fragile mental state:
specifically, the defense presented evidence that the twenty year-old Mr.
Williams was abused and neglected as a child, suffered from mental illness, and
basically had decompensated during the two months prior to the crime itself.317
Before the opening and closing statements are examined, a few points
merit discussion.
First, one reasonably can assume that the risk of implicit racial bias
was particularly high. The crime was committed by a black male against a
white female, and, as many studies have indicated,318 racial sentencing
disparities tend to be greatest in cases involving black defendants and white
victims.319 Moreover, as Professors Lynch and Haney have concluded,320 white
jurors (at least mock jurors) tend to lack empathy for black defendants in such
situations and even tend to view mitigating evidence as aggravating. Third, the
defendant was a young black male, and major implicit associations with such a
group include anger and violence. Although there was obvious anger and
violence in the case itself, implicit racial bias could lead jurors to interpret any
ambiguous evidence consistent with greater moral culpability and a higher risk
of future dangerousness.321
Second, although the prosecution’s case for guilt was very strong, the
sentencing case was a close one.322 Given the defense’s strong case in
mitigation, the need to use strategies to neutralize jurors’ implicit racial bias
was particularly acute: jurors with strong implicit biases will not hear a black
defendant’s evidence in mitigation as fully or as sensitively as will jurors
without such biases. Accordingly, the opening and closing statements assumed
particular importance.

314

Christopher Williams was not related to Mandy Williams.
Williams, 690 S.E.2d at 63.
316
Id.
317
See Transcript of Record at 2383–86, 2391, 2393, Williams, 690 S.E.2d 62 [hereinafter
Williams Transcript].
318
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
319
Moreover, Southern jurors—particularly any older Southern jurors—may have
disapproved of the prior interracial relationship between the defendant and the victim.
320
See supra notes 143–144, 148–149 and accompanying text.
321
See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Recall as well that the principle of outgroup
derogation suggests white jurors might attribute Williams’s violent behavior to a stable internal
disposition rather than to external stressors.
322
Although the jury ultimately returned a death sentence, initially it was deadlocked during
sentencing deliberations, with three jurors favoring life. Williams, 690 S.E.2d at 64.
315
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Unfortunately, however, defense counsel’s opening and closing
statements during sentencing (and during guilt, where Mr. Williams’s mental
state was at issue to a degree) made little use of any metaphors or narrative
strategies that might have neutralized jurors’ implicit racial biases. This is not
to say that counsel’s statements were inadequate, simply that they did little to
neutralize implicit racial biases. Obviously defense counsel were well prepared
for the sentencing trial: they had gathered substantial evidence concerning the
defendant’s horrific childhood, mental illness, and deterioration, and they
alluded to such evidence repeatedly during their opening and closing
narratives.323 Nonetheless, the opening and closing narrative did not include
many strategies to neutralize racial bias. Comparisons with the opening and
closing statements in United States v. Quinones make this clear.
First, however, defense counsel did prime certain important values.
Like defense counsel in Quinones, Williams’s lawyers reminded the jurors of
two of the central values animating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment: the dignity of human life and the duty of
individualized consideration during sentencing. As discussed above, defense
counsel for Quinones primed these values—both of which tend to neutralize
racial and ethnic schemas based on stereotypical ideas about groups—by using
a metaphor: “A child of God was born.” Here, Williams’s counsel more
directly reminded the jurors of the values in question: “We want you to listen
and to consider what you hear . . . because in fact life, any life is worth giving
meaningful consideration.”324 Antidiscrimination norms and other values can
be primed both directly and indirectly,325 and here Williams’s counsel directly
reminded jurors of the value of every human life. One might question whether
the reminder might have been even more effective had counsel used a widely
accepted metaphor (like child of God) or had counsel more frequently used
words that prime antidiscrimination norms (e.g., fairness).326
Also like counsel in Quinones, defense counsel for Williams arguably
included one counter-stereotypical exemplar. (Recall that use of counter-

323
See, e.g., Williams Transcript, supra note 317, at 1529 (describing “erosion of Chris’s
ability to control himself”); id. at 1530–31 (describing Williams’s mental health spiraling out of
control and culminating in a suicide attempt, a bizarre open assault, and the crime in question);
id. at 1534–35 (noting that the State obviously recognized that the defendant may have suffered
from psychiatric illness); id. at 2383–84 (describing Williams’s “atrocious family”); id. at 2385
(“He is the face of mental illness.”).
324
Id. at 2126 (emphasis added).
325
See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 101, at 1276 (noting the importance of activating
antidiscrimination norms “either directly or indirectly”).
326
Id. at 1277 (“For example, it appears that merely seeing or hearing words like ‘fairness’
can cause people to behave as if they are more committed to being fair, entirely without the
conscious knowledge of the subjects. This suggests that lawyers or others interested in countering
the effects of automatic stereotyping should insert into their presentations as many contrarian
priming words, pictures, and other stimuli as possible.”).
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stereotypical exemplars can inhibit implicit racial biases.)327 In Quinones, Alan
Quinones himself was the counter-stereotypical exemplar: he was a very
atypical drug trafficker. In Williams, the counter-stereotypical exemplar was
the defendant’s sister. Despite coming from an abusive, difficult background,
Williams’s sister, Maureen, became a college-educated professional:
Williams’s lawyer pointed out, “You know Maureen was kind of smart.
Maureen’s kind of smart. Maureen has put herself through college and has
become a nurse and she’s thought about how other families do it, and she’s
trying to do it.”328
Although counsel’s discussion of Maureen’s accomplishments
legitimately served important narrative purposes, unfortunately it likely did
little to inhibit activation of jurors’ implicit racial biases. This is true for three
reasons. First, the relevant implicit bias likely concerned African-American
males as opposed to African Americans more generally, so an AfricanAmerican female probably really isn’t a counter-stereotypical exemplar in this
context. Second, even assuming the relevant implicit bias concerned African
Americans generally, Maureen may well not have been considered a counterstereotypical exemplar, but, instead, a subtype (“the educated African
American”) that left the larger stereotype untouched.329 Third, defense counsel
explicitly contrasted the “kind of smart” Maureen with her “not the smartest
guy in the world”330 brother. Given these reasons, the discussion of Maureen
was unlikely to neutralize any implicit biases.
To a (minor) degree, counsel depicted Christopher Williams himself as
a counter-stereotypical exemplar by pointing to ways in which Mr. Williams
may not have fit the “black male criminal” stereotype. Counsel pointed out that
Mr. Williams “didn’t use drugs”331 despite a terrible childhood. Although Mr.
Williams had acted violently, it was during a “two-month period in his life”332
and was attributable to mental illness, a condition that ran in his family.333 In
short, if jurors hold implicit beliefs that black male violence is linked to
persistent anger and a generally violent disposition, then attributing Mr.
Williams’s violence to a short-term “melt down” caused by mental illness
(rather than by characteristic anger or dangerousness) may have helped to
exempt him, to a degree, from the usual stereotype.
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See supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text.
Williams Transcript, supra note 317, at 2384.
329
See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text.
330
Williams Transcript, supra note 317, at 2386.
331
Id.
332
Id. at 2392.
333
Id. at 2386 (“This is something that was given to his dad, this mental illness, it was given
to his mom. It was given to his grandparents, and it’s been given to him. And he didn’t choose
that.”).
328
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Generally, though, the defense narrative did little to neutralize any
implicit racial biases jurors may have held. In fact, if Alycee Lane is correct,334
then the defense’s portrayal of Mr. Williams’s “atrocious” and indifferent
family, with a mother who did nothing when her young son was struggling in
school335 and a father who left the family,336 may actually have exacerbated the
jurors’ implicit racial stereotypes. That said, the evidence concerning Mr.
Williams’s background was both true and significantly mitigating. What is one
to do if what should be mitigating has the potential to activate (or even
exacerbate) jurors’ unconscious prejudices? There are no simple answers, but,
when crafting opening and closing arguments, counsel should carefully
consider (1) how to prime themes based on fairness and equality, (2) how to
incorporate counter-stereotypical exemplars in the narrative, and (3) what kinds
of schemas might “fit” a client while supplanting jurors’ unconscious racial
schemas. In short, counsel’s strategy must take into account the risk that, if not
countered, jurors’ implicit racial bias may become an (invisible) star witness
for the prosecution.
V. CONCLUSION
My recommendations are tentative and modest, ultimately amounting
to little more than a cri de coeur. The stories death penalty lawyers tell in
opening and closing statements will not—cannot—eliminate implicit racial
biases that have been several hundred years in the making and that remain
pervasive in the United States. Indeed, the stories likely cannot even send such
biases into hibernation for the duration of a capital sentencing trial.
Nevertheless, death penalty lawyers must try to neutralize the invisible
witness—jurors’ implicit racial bias—first by learning about this witness, then
by studying and considering how best to discredit his pernicious testimony.
Both vigorous advocacy and fundamental principles of justice demand no less.
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See supra notes 261–263 and accompanying text.
Williams Transcript, supra note 317, at 2388 (describing parental indifference to the
defendant’s struggles in school).
336
Id. at 2385 (“And Dwight left a family situation that was so bad it caused him to leave his
son. Now, that’s either an indictment of the family or an indictment of Dwight. . . . Either way,
it’s not good for Chris.”).
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